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Abstract
As portable computing devices grow in popularity, so does the need for secure communications. Lacking tethers, these devices are ideal for forming small proximal groups in
an ad-hoc fashion in environments where no server or permanent services are available.
Members of these groups communicate over a broadcast or multicast network interconnect, and rely upon each other to form a cohesive group. While generally small in size
and short in lifetime, security is a critical aspect of these groups that has received much
academic attention in recent years.
Much of the research focuses upon generating a common, group-wide private key
suitable for encryption. This group key agreement utilizes keying technology that is
very costly for small, limited-lifetime devices. Furthermore, key agreement provides
no constructs for message authentication or integrity. Traditional systems require two
keypairs to address both aspects of the secure group – one for encryption, the other for
message validation.
This work investigates the appropriateness of using a shared keypair for both contributory group key agreement and message quality guarantees. A JCE-compliant key
agreement and digital signature framework has been implemented and is presented, and
discussed. Using elliptic curve-based keys, this is possible at no loss in security, and
these keys are easily and quickly computable on smaller devices. Algorithms that are
known for their cryptographic strength are leveraged in both encryption and digital signature applications. This technique provides a computationally-efficient key agreement
scheme and digital signature framework, and a network-efficient key and signature distribution system. Perfect forward and backward security is maintained, and all members
retain a current view of the group from a cryptographic perspective.
This thesis is the culmination of several quarters of research and work, all conducted
at the Rochester Institute of Technology under the supervison of Dr. Hans-Peter Bischof
between December 2002 and January 2004.
This thesis is completed as partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Masters Degree in Computer Science from the Rochester Institute of Technology.

Chapter 1

Introduction and Goals
Server-based network security is a well-defined and well-explored topic that enjoys
widespread and frequent use in modern computing. Transparent connections are made
at all computing levels. From the secure web browser session to IPSec sessions between
hardware devices, security is a critical and frequently overlooked aspect of networking.
Mobile computing with laptop computers is, in general, able to extend some of the
constructs and techniques shared by their desktop counterparts. This assumes, however, a wired medium for physical network transport.
Wireless computing, on the other hand, presents undeveloped and fertile ground for
research and development of security techniques. Many approaches that apply in the
wired world simply are not sufficient in a wireless network structure. Access control,
session cryptography, and authentication are major issues that have received a great
deal of attention in recent years, and will continue to be the subject of much effort. Wireless devices mimic radio transievers because they are broadcast-based stations, capable
of receiving all signals strong enough to reach their antennae. It is this broadcasting
that is at the crux of the security issues. Man-in-the-middle attacks are both possible
and relatively easy to execute. Denial of Service attacks are simply impossible to defend
against, as there is no medium access control. Through all this, the goal is generally to
configure a secure connection between a portable device and an access point to a larger
network. This is, in a general sense, comparable to the client-server model with a few
extra caveats.
A subset of wireless computing is the serverless environment, where there are no
access points and a network is defined simply by other nearby nodes. The focus of this
thesis is the ad-hoc serverless network topography. This environment is best described
through example. Suppose a group of corporate officials meet on a job site to discuss
and plan future developments. As many job sites are remote, it must be assumed there
are no servers to provide security services such as key generation or authentication
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(services akin to Kerberos). Each official is equiped with a computing device, such as a
PDA or laptop computer, and each device is network-ready. For security reasons, it is
important to be sure all meaningful communications are encrypted, and each message
is verified as both unmodified and sent from whom it reports its sender to be. Each of
these small devices are battery powered. The ability to form a logical grouping of these
devices, generate a shared key using influences from each member, and communicate
through these devices securely is needed.
As with any system, there are constraints that this system as well as each member
in the group is assumed to work within and abide by. In an ad-hoc wireless network
environment, these constraints are:
•

No central servers or services exist for security-related roles.

•

Each device is within proximal broadcast range of every other device par-

•

This broadcast medium is unreliable – message delivery or proper order-

•

Message routing is not supported.

•

Each device works in a manner consistent with group security, and does

•

Each device is able to compute the cryptographic components to facilitate

ticipating in the group.
ing is not guaranteed.

not work to limit or inhibit the functionality or security of the group.
group security in a timely manner.
–

It is permissible for larger systems, within proximal range, to participate in a group. This requires that employed techniques be sufficiently strong to not be compromized by any reasonable system (i.e., a
desktop computer should not be able to crack any security constructs
used in this environment).

•

Membership is dynamic and somewhat volatile. Security constructs must
support this instability to provide perfect forward and backward secrecy,
as well as general key freshness.

•

The responsibility of group maintenance must not fall upon a single member consistently. This encroaches too closely to the server/service paradigm,
and reliance upon this service will prove detrimental to group security,
stability, and scalability.

There are also a set of issues that this system will not address. These are as follows:
•

Broadcast network communication has unreliable delivery; reliability issues are not addressed in this thesis.

1.1 Motivation and Goals
•
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Each message sent must fit within one maximum transmission unit (MTU).
Multi-MTU messages require some degree of reliability; this topic is addressed later in Section 8.4.

•

Denial of Service attacks – these are impossible to defend against in this

•

User uthentication and Access control – this work defines the events im-

•

Group membership changes are announced – the current version does

environment.

mediately following user authentication and access control protocols.

not handle silent member leave events (moving out of broadcast range,
power failure, etc.). This would likely be handled by a heartbeat and
heartbeat monitoring functionality [12].

•

In terms of member operations, only single-member operations are supported in this version. Multi-party operations such as group merge and
partition are not supported at this time.
Conceptually the multi-party operations could be represented as a series
of single-member operations. For scalability and stability reasons, this
would likely result in a rewrite of a significant block of the protocol. This
is because it is possible in situations of multi-party operations that no
single member be able to compute the required subtree, and inter-subtree
communication and agreements would be required to complete the full
agreement sequence.

It is one of the goals of this document to provide an overview of the issues and current approaches to the issues surrounding serverless networking. Additionally, a novel
approach to minimizing key computations for key agreement and message authentication/integrity validation is presented and discussed. Included in this discussion is
a review and performance evaluation of the implemented framework leveraging elliptic
curve cryptography and modern encryption techniques.

1.1 Motivation and Goals
This work serves as a subsystem to the Many To Many Invocation/Many To Many Protocol (M2MI/M2MP) framework as developed in the Computer Science Department at
the Rochester Institute of Technology [13]. It is important to note, however, that this
security module does not rely upon any functionality from the M2MI/M2MP framework.
Compliance with the edu.rit.m2mp.Channel interface is maintained; some type-based
dependance is afforded.
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As development progressed in the M2MI/M2MP project, it was realized the issues
surrounding security and making a broadcast- or multicast-based system secure were
numerous. As a result development diverged from security issues, and its inclusion was
left for later.

Security Goals
It is the goal of this thesis to provide a secure channel of broadcast communication, situated within the M2MP framework. None of this effort relies upon the larger framework
in any functional way. This requires a series of distinct facets be addressed head-on:
1.

Confidentiality – Knowing and being guaranteed that it is computationally infeasible
for parties other than the intended receiver to determine the contents of a message.
This is typically accomplished through the use of cryptography, as the goals of
cryptography are privacy of data.
In two-party communications a series of options exist. For symmetric cipher systems, a shared common key is fed into an encryption scheme. This key is agreed
upon using a key agreement protocol, much like Diffie-Hellman. For asymmetric
cipher systems, a set of keypairs must exist and be known. A sender would then
encrypt a message with the receiver’s public key, and the receiver would then decrypt with their private key. This requires no key agreement, but does require an
up-to-date key database that must be known and trusted to be secure and safe
from tampering.
In multi-party communications, as in collaborative broadcast-based groups, encryption serves as a membership border. By the nature of broadcast, all nodes
within a sender’s broadcast range receive the message, but with encryption, only
those nodes with knowledge of the encryption key will be able to understand the
contents.

2.

Group Key Agreement – Multiple network nodes participating in a common group,
sharing a common cryptographic key. This is an area of active research as restrictions on both computational complexity and network utilization are frequently
imposed. It must be enforced that perfect backward and forward key secrecy be
maintained to prevent any decryption of any messages received while not a member of the group.

3.

Integrity Verification – Knowing and being guaranteed that a received message has
not been tampered with or altered in any way. This is generally done with the
employment of hashing. A message of n length is represented by a constant- length
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bit string of k bits. Any change in the message results in a dramatically different
hashcode, and any alteration of the hash will clearly not match the data. Using
just hash code values does not prevent a third party from modifying the payload
and injecting a new and valid code.
4.

Authentication – Knowing and being guaranteed that a received message from sender
S was in fact sent by S. This functionality is combined with integrity verification,
and provided through the use of digital signatures, and, in a more connected world,
supported by digital certificates and the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
Signatures are based on public and private keypairs. A message would be signed
with the sender’s private key, and later verifed with the sender’s public key. This
provides irrefutable proof a particular sender sent any given message. Signing
includes a mixture of private key and a hash of the message. This verifcation may
be done by any party privy to the signature and the signers public key.
The use of elliptic curve-based keys will be evaluated for appropriateness in group

key agreement and digital signature.

A protocol using objects and object serializa-

tion/deserialization will be implemented supporting member join and leave group events.
Key-related events and calculations will be compared to RSA/DSA style keys, as generated by the Java security framework (formally known as the Java Cryptography Extension, or the JCE).
Constructs based on RSA/DSA-style parameters will be compared and contrasted
with curve-based security systems, and evaluated in general terms for their appropriatness in group settings.
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Part I

Background

Chapter 2

Current Security Constructs
Complete network security is comprised of three distinct facets – confidentiality, message integrity, and message authentication. Confidentiality can be gained through encryption, following a sequence of one or more key agreement rounds. Message integrity
and authentication are ensured through the use of digital signatures.

2.1 Key Agreement
Several protocols have been defined for this purpose, such as CLIQUES [35], Tree-based
Group Diffie-Hellman (TGDH) [23], [24], Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) and their extensions (LKH++) [30], and selected others.
There are, in general, two schools on group keying. One, the distributory school, relies
on a single member to exist in all subgroups and survive from the the beginning to the
end of the group’s lifecycle. It would be the responsibility of this member to construct
and deliver the group key to all group members. While this is very simple, it violates
a critical set of our intentions (most notably reliance upon a single group member for
providing cryptographic data to the group). The second group keying philosophy, the
contributory philosophy, is the de-facto technique. This technique requires every group
member influence the final key in some way, and relies upon no constant or common
services or members.
Other secure group environments rely upon every node owning a copy of the key prior
to membership; not quite the distributory or contributory designs. This environment
would then simply require access control constructs, and provides little security to group
members. This works if all members and potential members have the same priviledge to
access the network and guarantees can be made that those elements that should not be
members cannot be members.
Regardless of which key agreement style is chosen, possession of the correct group
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key is used to delineate group boundaries; those nodes with the correct key are in a
specific group, while those without are not.
Below is a discussion and an evaluation of the most common techniques of executing
group key agreement.
All key agreement techniques implement some form of the Diffie-Hellman key agreement algorithm, discussed further in Section 6.3.

2.1.1 Linear Group Key Agreement
Linear group key agreement techniques such as CLIQUES [35] provide a simple path to
key agreement for a group of devices.
In this scheme, all group members must obtain the entire key string (that is, all
intermediate agreement key sequences). Each node computes the final key based on the
values of every other partial key in the group. This completes in O(n) time.

Figure 2.1: Linear Key Agreement
Figure 2.1 shows the truly linear nature of this style of key agreement. Supposing we
start at node 1, our private key would be used to generate a common shared key with
node 2, which would then be used in an agreement with node 3. This process would
continue for all n nodes. Any other node would also start at with node 1, but clearly skip
their own public key value.
All nodes visit all other nodes, and compute similar intermediate keys (these will
clearly not be identical as the initial private key differs), generating a common final
group key.
There are two popular techniques to approach linear key agreement. One places the
burden of computing the new key upon the joining member, the other upon an existing
member.
The first technique requires the new member receive all existing public keys from
the group, append their public key, and fully compute the new group key. A broadcast
message will deliver this new key chain to the group. This is secure because the current
group key (pre-join) has been computed without inclusion of the joining member; he’s
gained nothing from the group and the group has lost no security. The joining member
can compute a new key using his private key and the group’s public keys, but this key
will be very different from the existing group key.

2.1 Key Agreement
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The second technique, as utilized by CLIQUES [35], passes the entire key chain to
the joining member. They then append their public share, modify (via intermediate key
agreement) every other keyshare in the chain, and pass the new chain back to their
joining sponsor. The sponsor then computes a new chain of intermediate key values
using their private key, and distributes this final chain to the group. Each node can
then locate their subkey, and recompute the final group key. This technique is clearly
more intensive from a resource allocation and computational perspective, and as such,
generally not desireable for implementation.
Issues surrounding linear key agreement in general are further discussed in Section 8.2.

2.1.2 Tree-Based Group Key Agreement
Tree structures provide a method of key agreement and management that has several
desirable qualities. The very nature of being in a tree formation reduces the complexity from O(n) to O(log n) and provides a well-suited structure for dynamic membership
changes. As elements change membership status, the tree requires only a few key-node
updates to modify the whole tree. This means only a few messages are passed, reducing
computational complexity and bandwidth.
Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH)
This scheme, as presented by [30], places all group members at the leaves of an order-m
B-Tree, and consists of a series of intermediate subgroup keys. Built from the bottom
up, intermediate keys higher in the tree serve greater numbers of group members, where
the root of the tree is the group key.
The keys delivered to each member are shared, in essence, with no other nodes with
the exception of the root. All intermediate keys, however, are shared by all dependents
(children in this subtree) of the inner-tree node.
This group tree, in most LKH implementations, is stored on one designated host. It
is clear from the role that this node must be a nearly permanent fixture in the model, as
failure would place the group in a state of near total confusion. This could be tempered
by distibuting the entire key tree to a few network elements, thereby permitting group
recovery from a known state, and prevent total group reconstruction.
Membership changes initially affect only those keys above and to the most direct path
to the root. As these intermediate values change, a secondary flow will change all other
members keys to guarantee perfect forward security and key freshness.
This minimal-impact effect of trees initiated by membership changes helps key distribution problems immensely.
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Some thought about this design will reveal an interesting observation – LKH is a
combination of linear- and tree-based key agreement. On one hand we have the tree
structure maintaining the tree, but to do an agreement at a given tree node, a linear
sequence of agreement rounds needs to occur. We gain very little computationally or in
network terms using LKH over linear agreement techniques.
Figure 2.2 shows the general form of LKH agreement on an order-k tree. The first leaf
node, for example, is network elements 1 through (k − 1).

Figure 2.2: Logical Key Heirarchy Key Agreement

Extentions to Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH++)
The paper by DiPietro et al ([30]) describes an extension to Logical Key Hierarchy that
uses hashing and intermediate key values. Using a key distribution node, dubbed the
center, this protocol attempts to require a minimal amount of network communication
and message computation to generate and share the group key. As in other techniques,
intermediate values between any given node and the root are required to be maintained
by each node.
The main difference between this protocol and other protocols is the use of hashing.
The authors of [30] describe how a new key, K 0 is to be sent to the group, encrypted
with the current group key K. The center computes the one-way hash of K (written as
H(K)), followed by the xor of the new key and the hash of the current ( K̂ = H(K) ⊕ K 0 ,

and sends this to the group. Group members then recover the new key by computing

K 0 = H(K) ⊕ K̂. By hashing the values, the key is never sent in the clear or even as a

collection of partial values. Rather, its delivered in a pseudo-encrypted form that only

current members, those elements with the current key, can decode and retrieve the new
key.
The benefits of this technique are a general reduction in resource consumption. They,
[30], noted a fifty percent drop in computations done by the key center, and a fifty percent
reduction in required bandwidth for group formation.

2.1 Key Agreement
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Doubly-Rooted Trees
As an extension of basic singly-rooted trees, Diamonds [32] defines a tree structure that
has many desireable properties. Firstly, as a means to maintain group functionality with
basic survivability properties, each node is bi-connected. The simplest way to achieve
this is by arranging all nodes in a circle. This has a side affect of having a diameter
that increases with each member addition, which results in increased network latency.
Diamonds, on the other hand, are recursively defined as having two links to other nodes.
This helps maintain the connectivity that a singly-connected graph (binary tree) can not
have, and the structure grows logarithmically with increased membership.
Aided by structure maintenance functionality, the diamond graphs are easily maintained and restructured to maintain their bi-connected status. As the diamond is recursively defined, nodes are positioned in the structure in a manner preserving ballance. As
one side of a diamond grows, so must the other to maintain this ballance. It is this ballance that allowed nearly horizontal growth patterns in performance tests [32] for group
reconstruction computations, and slight growth in latency as group sizes grew from five
to fifty.
Figure 2.3 shows the basic form of the diamond structure.

Figure 2.3: Double-Rooted Key Agreement

Full and Complete Binary Trees
The tree structure used in the implementation of this Thesis is very similar to the Logical
Key Hierarchy system, with a few important deviations. While LKH is an order-m B-tree
(a binary tree with instead of two children, up to m children are supported), our tree
is strictly order-one (one key value with two child references). Instead of the tree being
stored and maintained by one central node, the tree is distributed throughout the entire
group. This aids in general group scalability as well as stability.
This key agreement structure was chosen for its simplicity both algorithmically and
computationally.
Figure 2.4 shows the general form of the key agreement structure as implemented by
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this work.

Figure 2.4: Binary Tree-Based Key Agreement

2.2 Message Authentication
In general, message integrity and authentication is achieved through digital signature
techniques. Recent advances in encryption provide some authentication guarantees, but
these are generally ineffectual for this setting (see [22], [21] and [33]). Such encryption
schemes are useful between two parties where each can inject a unique sequence, the
nonce or a counting value, and use it in an authentication capacity. In the multiparty setting, this would require a lookup table of member-to-sequence, and would incur
futher message processing overhead. Additionally, this would impose greater processing
requirements at the time of member-join and in key distribution.
Traditionally, keys used in key agreement are inappropriate for digital signature applications. While this is true for RSA/DSA-style keys, this is not the case for elliptic
curve-based keys. This halving of group keys reduces the total number of keys that
would otherwise need distribution to the group and generally simplifies the inner- and
inter-node protocols.
Having a public and private keypair at the root of our key tree provides us with one
additional feature. While not investigated in this work, a group signature would provide
an inter-group security construct. Other work has investigated this further.

2.3 Message Authentication Concerns
Using digital signatures requires a keypair suitable for this purpose, requiring distribution of a second key for each node in this group. Requiring a second key to be generated,
maintained, and distributed for each node serves as the motivation behind using the
same key for key agreement and signing, as investigated by this thesis.
Digital signature keys are generally static entitities with a reasonably long lifetime.
In this dynamic setting, however, long-term keys are both a vulnerability and a logistical
stumbling block. They are a vulnerability in the sense that with each message that is

2.3 Message Authentication Concerns
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signed, a portion of the private key is revealed. Slowly, the entire private key could be
revealed. Long-lifetime keys are a stumbling block as maintaining a database of trusted
verification keys over a period of time becomes a storage issue and a practicability issue.
It would be far easier to simply regenerate a key for each group than to try to maintain
a history of all members keys in all previously attended groups. Additionally, this would
require that every participant in a group maintian a secure and off-network storage of
their signature keypair for restoration after battery replacement – no more battery hotswap in the field. Using temporal signature keys would allow the group key to change
over time and membership, without the storage or server-based constraints.
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Part II

Thesis Work
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The code phase of this thesis work included implementing several aspects of the
secure broadcast channel. Included in this codebase is:
•

JCE-compliant Digital Signature provider, implementing the HORS digital

•

Message hierarchy.

•

Message serialization support.

•

Protocol definition.

•

JCE-compliant tree-based key agreement module for RSA/DSA and ellip-

•

JCE-compliant digital signature module using RSA/DSA and elliptic curve

•

JCE-compliant cryptography module using RSA/DSA and elliptic curve

•

Broadcast network communications point.

•

Support classes to maintain state and references for framework.

•

Adaptation of Java-internal classes for JCE key manipulation.

•

Integration with M2MI/M2MP.

•

JavaDoc comments of all components of all implemented elements.

signature algorithm [31].

tic curve-based keys.
keys.
keys.

One aspect of this thesis is to make encryption and message authentication more
streamlined. This has been accomplished by using the same keys for both operations.
This technique has not been explored in other security related research. An evaluation
of this idea is provided in chapter 6.
The following chapters discuss the overall design of the security framework from a
high-level perspective, and then describe individual components. A tour of both innerand inter-node operations and proceses, and finally a cryptographic analysis of components is provided.

Page 20

Chapter 3

System Design and Specification
The security framework is divided into a collection of modular blocks as follows:
Communication
Messages

Network I/O in a non-blocking broadcast fashion.

Messages are the method of communication. Designed and manipulated as

Java objects, messages must be serialized before communication, and deserialized
back into objects upon receipt. An object-oriented design makes handling and
inner-node processing easier.
For efficient marshalling, these message objects all have common ancestry and
follow a common template of design. This outlined further in Section A.1.
Key Agreement

Core of security constructs. This provides storage of all member

public keys as well as the functionality to generate common group key.
The tree-based system is modeled after work described in [24] and uses a common
tree-based key storage system for agreement and maintaining digital signature verification keys. It is this framework that provides the private key values to encryption
and public key values of other group members to the digital signature verification
modules.
Signatures

Module that optionally provides message authentication support through

the use of digital signatures. Ties closely to the Key Agreement module for members’
verification keys.
Cryptography

Module that provides the optional cryptographic utilities to ensure

group-wide secrecy.
Message Handling

Tied closely to both the communication and message modules,

the message handler is the core of the processing infrastructure. This is defined by
a reactor-style event-driven sequence. Messages are processed in object form (see
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the Messaging description above and below) and acted upon in the order in which
they are received.
Provisions have been taken to ensure that user-level messages (ApplicationMessages) are processed simultaneously with all protocol-level messages that are
exchanged. This provides a nearly transparent channel of secured communications.
These messages are, however, only processed upon achievment of Member status.
State Repository

Classes whose sole responsibility is to maintain relationships to

the various high-level modules and maintain protocol and group member state
information.
M2MP Interface

Written as an M2MP Channel implementation, this class is the only

class that needs instantiation for incorporation into any M2MI/M2MP application.

3.1 Network
The design of the network interface for this project was very simple. In an attempt
to acurately model a broadcast environment, like that of a wireless device, this channel
utilizes the broadcast network. Messages are written to the IP address 255.255.255.255,
and read from the address 0.0.0.0. This is correct for broadcast communication.
Some rate limiting is done to help control the amount of data being sent from any
one node. This primarily serves to increase reception rates of messages as a high rate of
dispatch was shown to steadily decrease receipt rates.

3.2 Message Processing
Each node receives all messages sent in the group, but only processes messages addressed to two values – those messages ’unicast’ to their ID, and broadcast messages
sent to the entire group.
All messages flow through a common processing sequence:
1.

Data is received into a byte array by the CommPort network interface.

2.

This byte array is passed to the MessageHandler.

3.

A quick check is made to be sure the message is not from ourselves.

4.

Message reconstruction follows, where these steps are taken:
(a)

A first attempt at message reconstruction is made. This is done via
library call to MessageUtils.

3.3 Security
(b)
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If this reconstruction fails, a second reconstruction is attempted after
decryption with the current key (assuming encryption is enabled).

(c)

If this second attempt also fails, the message is considered unrecoverable and simply discarded.

5.

If a message object has been recovered, we first check to ensure the message is not from us, and then for a digital signature. If a signature is
present and signature verification fails, this message is discarded.
While this may seem extreme, it is understood that if it was important
enough to sign, it must be important enough to successfully verify.
Accepting a message that fails signature validation might almost not have
been signed.

6.

An exising message is then processed based on message type and both
node and protocol states.

7.

During processing, the incident message is consumed. A reply message
may be generated (depending on the state and behaviour of the protocol).
(a)

If signatures are enabled, this message would then be digitally signed.

(b)

Likewise, if cryptography is enabled, this message would then be enciphered with the current group key.

(c)

The final byte array of the processed message is then sent via the
CommPort instance.

3.3 Security
Security in this framework is broken into two phases – privacy and message authentication. Privacy is supported through encryption, with authentication through digital
signatures.

3.3.1 Key Agreement
Using a full binary tree (a tree where each element has either zero or two children), we
can efficiently compute a group key in O(dlog ne) agreement cycles.
Two important observations about groups and group security must be highlighted.
The first is that smaller devices cannot compare computationally to larger computing
devices. As a result, these smaller devices run a risk of cryptographic compromise. The
nature of signing a message is a partial revealing of the sending party’s private key. With
time, the entire private key is revealed, and a patient and determined third party could
begin forging valid message signatures.
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The second observation is that the keys and signatures used in this setting are very
short-lived. Public keys used in key agreement and signature verification are valid only
as long as the lifetime of the group or the duration of a members’ affiliation with the
group.
Combining these two observations motivates the use of dynamic, temporal signature
keys, as described by [31, 10].

3.3.2 Message Integrity and Authentication
Message integrity in the strict sense is ensuring data received has not been modified. A
naïve approach would be simple checksums, but a fatal pitfall to this technique is that a
third party may modify the data and insert a modified, and correct, integrity checksum.
Clearly this approach will not suffice.
Message Authentication Codes (MAC’s), or more specifically Hashed-MAC’s (HMAC’s)
are also inappropriate for this environment. These constructs provide data integrity
validation, but do not provide message authentication, as the authenticating bytes are
generated and verified using the same cryptographic key. Message authentication codes
are useful for quickly determining if a file on a computer has changed, but little more
[25].
Traditional algorithms for message authentication rely on digital signatures, generally accompanied by a digital certificate chain to prove authenticity. Digital signatures
provide the same unique hash value as MAC’s, but include verifiable data from a private
key value. This allows a receiver (who, it must be assumed, possesses the associated
public key) to verify both the identity of the sender and the message data.
While the dynamic network system will also utilize digital signatures, one critical
difference exists with a more connected computing paradigm. In this setting, there is no
way of verifying a chain of trust as presented in a certificate. This means, technically,
we really do not know who the sender of a message is, but we do know that the message
was not modified in transport. We can associate a message with a device or a user, but
have very little proof of user authenticity.
Additionally, signature and key agreement keys are separate entities. This is done
for algorithmic and mathematical integrity rather than security purposes. As discussed
in Section 6, this thesis uses elliptic curve-based keys which are able to work for both
applications.
The unique strength of elliptic curve keys is presented in this thesis – using the same
keys for generating the common group encryption key as for signing messages. The
private key is used to sign a message, whereas the public key, distributed as part of the
key tree to the entire group, is used for signature verification. Other research does not

3.3 Security
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explore this application of dual-role keys.
This technique provides us with several desireable affects. First, we have one key
to distribute per node instead of one key for encryption key generation and one key for
signature verification. Second, when a node serves as group sponsor for a joining or
leaving member, their keypair is regenerated. This enforces both forward and backward
secrecy from an encryption point of view, but also updates the signature keys – our
dynamic and temporal signature system.
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Chapter 4

Completed Work
The security framework consists of a series of packages representing functionality. These
are listed and discussed here.
Many of the cornerstone classes (eg, the *Engine classes) have a report() method
to report statistics and current state. This is useful for monitoring the behavior and
condition of the various modules, and is accessable via a method call to report() from
an instance of the SecureChannel class.
Section A.2 provides a high-level view of module interaction.
Package listing and functionality description:
The FlexiECProvider Provider Package

Provides all the elliptic curve-based function-

ality as used by this research, including key generation, key agreement, and digital
signature functionality. Implemented as JCE provider, the implementation is compatable with several international security standards. Available from http://www.flexiprovider.de [16].

The FlexiCoreProvider Provider Package

Also a JCE Provider, this package provides

curve-compatable encryption routines, secure hash functions and secured random
number generation. Available from http://www.flexiprovider.de [15].
edu.rit.m2mp.security

Top-level package contains edu.rit.m2mp.Channel imple-

mentation via SecureChannel class. All other classes in this framework are utilized
by the channel and should not be instantiated by other classes or applications.
edu.rit.m2mp.security.comm

Provides non-blocking broadcast network communica-

tion support. Using a thread pool from the edu.rit.m2mp.security.utils package, multiple threads are capable of reading and processing in quick succession to
permit prompt reaction to incident messages.
Unlike their wired counterparts, there is no concept of medium access control in
a broadcast environment. To this end, we cannot assume a single message being
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available for network reading at any one time. This scalability supports greater
group stability and consistency.
Provides JCE-based encryption through all currently-

edu.rit.m2mp.security.crypto

loaded JCE providers. The Sun provider supplies several encryption algorithms
sufficient for the scope of this work.
edu.rit.m2mp.security.handlers

At present, this package contains the ’pinging’ thread

used in group formation/discovery.
edu.rit.m2mp.security.keyagree

Provides tree-based key agreement functionality with

the sole purpose of group key generation.
edu.rit.m2mp.security.messages

Defines message framework and hierarchy. This is

diagramed in Section A.1. Also provided is the functionality to decompose and
recompose message objects to and from serialized byte arrays.
edu.rit.m2mp.security.signatures

Provides JCE-based digital signatures for mes-

sages. Tied closely to the key agreement classes through a KeyProxy class, the
public shares of members’ public-private keypairs are used for signature validation.
edu.rit.m2mp.security.signatures.hors.*

Implementation of the Hash to Obtain Ran-

dom Signatures (HORS) digital signature algorithm as described by [31]. This is not
used by this system as public keys are too large to be practical. This remains in
the source tree as proof-of-concept work.
edu.rit.m2mp.security.utils

Utility classes to support number translations to and

from byte arrays and array-based operations. Also home to the ThreadPool class
used by the CommPort class for multi-threaded reading.
(several).test

Several packages have test sub-packages to examine functional per-

formance in their parent packages.

4.1

edu.rit.m2mp.security

“Root-level” package that provides a coordination point and access point into the security
framework.
SecureChannel

Implementation of the edu.rit.m2mp.Channel interface, and is the

only class that should be instantiated by any application. This class provides a

4.2 edu.rit.m2mp.security.comm
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foothold into the security framework, providing status, accessor and mutator methods for aspects controlling inner operation. The ability to redirect error messages
and status messages to other displays is also possible.
MessageHandler

Reactory-style message processor of system.

Receives messages

from edu.rit.m2mp.security.comm.CommPort, decrypts byte array, reconstructs
object, verifies signature, and processes message.

If message results in state

change or requires reply, reply is sent to edu.rit.m2mp.security.comm.CommPort
for transmission.
ProtocolConstants and Repository

Maintain state and inter-module references for

inner-framework use. The ProtocolConstants class is a collection of constant values for configuration of options and general operation.
ExceptionHandler and ExceptionListener

Provide a means to redirect error mess-

sages and exception handling. Many exceptions are passed up through this system
to the Channel. This provides the ability to deliver security-layer messages to a
user for display or extended handling. By default, these are written to standard
error.
Each of these classes are interfaces to allow additional implementation. The MessageHandler class implements these interfaces, and uses the DefaultExceptionHandler and DefaultExceptionListener classes to write to the standard error
stream. The NullExceptionListener consumes all messages and displays no
output.
OutputHandler and OutputListener

Similar to the ExceptionHandler / Exception-

Listener pair, this provides a redirection of status and reporting messages. This
provides a means of obtaining system-wide status report information for user display or inquiry by other systems.
Each of these classes are interfaces to allow additional implementation. The MessageHandler class implements these interfaces, and uses the DefaultOutputHandler
and DefaultOutputListener classes to write to the standard output stream. The
NullOutputListener consumes all messages and displays no output.

4.2

edu.rit.m2mp.security.comm

Package that defines a network-knowledgeable endpoint for arriving and departing messages. These are written as broadcast UDP packets.
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Network-level access point. The current implementation reads and writes

CommPort

to the broadcast address.
A ready set of threads is kept warm for prompt reads from the network channel.
This is provided by an instance of the edu.rit.m2mp.security.utils.ThreadPool
class.
Reader

Small object to read from network. This was broken out of the CommPort

object to allow higher-speed multi-threaded reads.
Minimal effort would need be expended to convert this output device to other types of
connections. It may also be desired to convert this system to a pipe-like implementation
of the edu.rit.m2mp.Channel interface instead of an endpoint design.

4.3

edu.rit.m2mp.security.crypto

CryptoEngine

Provides access to JCE and other cryptographic functionality. This

allows selection of many types of encryption algorithms useful in testing.
Cryptographic algorithm is dependent upon key style currently in use; elliptic curve
keys do not work in the JCE ciphers expecting RSA/DSA-style keys.
Two instances of the javax.crypto.Cipher class are used; one is initialized for
encryption only, the other for decryption only. This provides the fastest possible
processing time as two messages could be encrypted and decrypted simultaneously
without synchronization issues.

4.4

edu.rit.m2mp.security.handlers

Discovery

Small class to do pre-membership probes. This functionality runs in a

thread that is only terminated when the desire to not be in any group is registered
with the Channel. This allows automatic rediscovery of a group in the event of
disconnection.
Once the protocol for membership has begun, this thread is assigned a low priority. This permits state-probing for re-activation, but keeps resource consumption
minimal.
This could be duplicated and modified to perform group-to-group discovery with
the goal of forming the largest possible group. Scalability issues arise as group
rekeying messages can become too large for practicality.

4.5 edu.rit.m2mp.security.keyagree

4.5
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edu.rit.m2mp.security.keyagree

Package designed to maintain the classes required to support tree-based key agreement.
Provides the front-end to key agreement, parameter generation,

AgreementEngine

key operations including key generation, regeneration from bytes, and agreement.
Also provides high-level functionality for member operations such as member join
and member leave.
AgreementImpl

Parent class to all agreement techniques. This provides common

functionality used in many agreement styles.
TreeAgreement

Full implementation of tree-based key agreement and key-based op-

erations (eg. key refresh). Extension of the AgreementImpl class.
Tree

Maintains the current view of all members’ public keys and intermediate public/private key values. This is based primarily on descriptions of work done in [24]
with optimizations and enhancements implemented where needed.

Node and MemberNode

Containment and organizational classes used within the tree

to maintain member data. Instances of MemberNode represent group members and
exist at the leaves of the tree, where the remainder of the tree consists of Node
objects.
KeyProxy

Provides other packages, specifically the edu.rit.m2mp.security.signa-

tures classes, access to all public keys currently active in the group. It is through
this class that key queries are funneled.

4.6

edu.rit.m2mp.security.messages

Definition of objects used to control inter-node security constructs and protocols. These
messages never extend into application-space as they are entirely consumed by the
channel constructs.
The format of all messages is as diagrammed in Figure 4.1. It is this format that
allows robust and prompt serialization and deserialization of message objects during
transport phases.
It is also important to note that not all messages carry an explicit payload; some
messages relay information and intent by their type, for example the LeaveRequest and
AgreeACK messages.
GroupMessage

Interface that defines the basic operations supported by all messages

in the protocol.
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Start Byte

Byte Count

Optional

0

1

no

Protocol message identifier

1

1

no

Message type identifier

2

4

no

Source node Id value

6

4

no

Destination node Id value

10

4

no

Message sequence number

14

1

no

Digital signature length

15

≥0

yes

Digital signature (depends on algorithm)

1

no

Payload length

varies

yes

Payload

≥ 15

≥ 16

Description

Table 4.1: Message Packet Structure

GroupMessageImpl

Provides the base implementation of many of the methods defined

in the GroupMessage interface for inheritance by the various message classes. All
message objects in this package must extend this class for consistent functionality.
MessageConstants

Storage of message-oriented constant values; used by Message-

Utils and MessageHandler (from the edu.rit.m2mp.security.security package) classes for various processing routines.
MessageUtils

Provides a common serialization and deserialization framework for

messages.

4.7

edu.rit.m2mp.security.signatures

Parent-package supplying digital signature functionality. Both JCE and elliptic-curve
algorithms are available, but their use is predicated on which key algorithm is currently
in use.
Just as the encryption module uses two service providers, this module employs two
instances of the java.security.Signature class. Again, this allows simultaneous processing of two messages without suffering from synchronization issues.
SigningEngine

Tied with the key agreement package via a KeyProxy object, manages

digital signature signing and verification processes.
When signing a message, the following message fields are included in the signature
hash:
1.

Message type

4.8 edu.rit.m2mp.security.signatures.hors
2.

Message source identifiers

3.

Message destination identifiers

4.

Message sequence number

5.

Message payload
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For enhanced response and processing time, initialization of the signature module
includes two separate signature objects; one for signing, one for verification. This
limits the requirement for behavior mode switching with every message.
As mentioned in the discussion of the KeyAgreement package, the members’ public
keys used in signature validation are accessed by an instance of the KeyProxy
class. This limits key data replication within the security framework.

4.8

edu.rit.m2mp.security.signatures.hors

The HORS algorithm (Hash to Obtain Random Signature), as described in [31], was
implemented as closely to the specification as possible.
This was implemented as a JCE-compatable Provider object.
While functional, this technique is not used in the greater framework for performance
reasons – public keys and signatures were too large for general use in this small-message
environment.
A partial solution is to hash the final signature; this will provide a collision-resistant
fixed-length representation of the signature. This improvement will not, however, affect
public key sizes.
Additionally, these keys could not be used for group-wide key agreement without
additional modification and security analysis. This inadequacy violates the goals of using
a common key for both signatures and encryption-key computation.
A insiders view of a HORS keypair and key serialization/deserialization is available
in Appendix C.
HORSProvider

Gateway class used by Java Security framework for referencing and

loading requested functionality.
HORSParameterGenerator

Generates random values used by HORS algorithm during

key generation.
HORSKeyPairGenerator

Using parameters and random seeds, generates a keypair to

be used in digital signature generation and verification.
HORSKeyFactory

Reconstucts an encoded key into key objects.
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HORSPrivateKey and HORSPublicKey

Private and public keyshare values for signa-

ture keys using the HORS algorithm. As with all other digital signature algorithms,
the private key is used for signing data and the public key is used for signature
verification.
The public key is a function of the private, and should provide no easy way to
reconstruct the private key (ie, using a private exponent or multiplier).
HORSSignature

Main functionality class that processes all signing operations.

The HORS algorithm, like other cryptographic systems, has three distinct modes of
operation - parameter generation, signing of data, and verification of this signature.
Parameter Generation
int l, k, v, h
while (true) {
l = randomValue()
if (l >= 128 && l <= 768)
if (l mod 64 == 0)
break
}
return quad[l, 16, 160, SHAIdentifier]

The values of k = 16, t = 160 and using SHA for hashing are default and set for testing
and compatability. Other values for l, k, and t were suggested and evaluated in [31].
The bit-size of l may be passed as a parameter, as well as the desired hashing algorithm to influence parameter generation.
Signing
Assume integer parameters t are k established.
byte[] data
PrivateKey key
byte[] hash = oneway(data)
int[] substrings = new int[k]
substrings = breakHashIntoSubstringsModuloT(hash, substrings, t)
byte[] signature = new byte[0]
for i = 0 to k
signature += key[substrings[i]]
return signature

4.9 edu.rit.m2mp.security.signatures.hors.interfaces
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Verifying
Assume integer parameters t are k established.
byte[] sig
PublicKey key
byte[] hash = oneway(data)
int[] substrings = new int[k]
substrings = breakHashIntoSubstringsModuloT(hash, substrings, t)
int[] blocks = new int[k]
blocks = breakSignatureIntoSubstrings(sig)
for i = 0 to k {
if (key[substrings[i]] != oneway(blocks[i]))
return false
}
return true

The oneWayHash function generates a byte array representative of the parameter data.
This implementation supports SHA-based hashing as well as a custom implementation
of a hashing algorithm (algorithm selection is configurable).
This custom hashing algorithm is loosely based on the hashCode() method of the
java.math.BigInteger class, and like SHA, returns a constant-length hashcode.
The breakHashIntoSubstringsModuloT method segments this known-length hash
and segments it into k equal-length substrings. Each of these substrings is stored as an
integer value modulo t.

4.9

edu.rit.m2mp.security.signatures.hors.interfaces

HORSKey, HORSPrivateKey, and HORSPublicKey

Define the basic functionalty and pro-

vide type safety for keys in the HORS framework.
HORSKeyPairGenerator

Define the basic functionality for a key pair generator, as

well as comply with required JCE patterns for adaptation by the JCE framework.

4.10

edu.rit.m2mp.security.signatures.hors.spec

HORSPrivateKeySpec, and HORSPublicKeySpec

Define the basic properties and func-

tionality of public and private keys of the HORS algorithm.
HORSParameterSpec
algorithm.

Define the basic properties of keying parameters in the HORS
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edu.rit.m2mp.security.utils

Support for building larger byte arrays from multiple smaller sequences.
Functionality for reducing and reconstructing multi-byte primitive values

into byte arrays of proper length and visa versa.
ThreadPool

Tunable collection of ready threads. This allows immediate response to

new tasks with thread startup overhead penalties only incurred once. This is a
stable collection of threads; if a task being run by a thread dies unexpectedly, this
pool will initialize a new thread to replace it immediately.

Chapter 5

Operational Overview
5.1 Node Initialization
Each node is uniquely identified by a Java integer value. This value is chosen at random at startup. We assume the likelyhood of two nodes selecting the same identifier is
small enough to be ignored, however this could be combatted by selecting a new unique
identifier after a timeout period while probing for a group. Following this selection, a set
of algorithm parameters to be used in key agreement and signature keypair generation
is generated. It is important to note that no keypairs are generated at this point; this is
done only after contact with another entity, either a lonely node or group, is established.
The various constructs, such as the key agreement infrastructure and message handling systems are then initialized. Once ready, the Discovery thread is initiated, and the
node begins searching for a group.
The Discovery phase, as mentioned above in the discussion of the handler, is simply a
repeated broadcast JoinRequest message consisting of the current node’s ID value and
the parameters they have generated. This message is rebroadcast on a periodic interval
until either a response is received or the desire to not join any group is registered with
the Channel.
When a second member receives this message, one of two protocols follow. If the
responding party, for discussion named β, is also alone, the parameters used by the new
group are those parameters generated by the node with the larger identifiying number.
This is outlined in the Genesis section below. If, on the other hand, the responding party
is part of a group, β’s parameters are used. This is described further in the Member
Operations with Existing Groups section below.
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5.2 Genesis
Genesis occurs at the initial formation of a group; where two or more nodes converge
and form common group structures. For discussion, assume two nodes, α with ID value
n and β with ID value m where m > n, wish to form a group together.
One of three possible scenarios follows:
1.

Each will receive the other’s request.

2.

Node α will receive β’s request, but β will not receive α’s request (at nearly
the same time).

3.

Node β will receive α’s request, but α will not receive β’s request (at nearly
the same time).

In the case of the first scenario, both α and β will be able to decide proper group
responsibilities. As β’s ID is larger, the parameters generated and presented by β will be
used by the new group.
The second situation will require an additional membership probe from α (assumably
after a timeout has lapsed) to continue the joining process.
In the third scenario, since β’s ID is larger, β is able to reply immediately with a
JoinGrant message to α.
A unicast message is then sent from β to α with confirmation of the parameters by
JoinGrant message. Since these parameters are likely different from those that were
locally generated, keys are generated by both parties with these parameters. β can
simply save the local keypair, but α must deliver their new public key to β through a
unicast NewKey message.
Upon receipt, β then can update the keytree and compute the new group key. The
entire tree is delivered from β to α — a new group has been formed.
An important theme through this is a pair-wise communication. This is achieved
through synchronization and timeout monitoring to be sure only two parties are forming
a group at any given time. It is entirely possible that for an even n nodes, n/2 groups
are formed. While these groups could begin to merge together with the goal of forming a
larger group, this was left for future efforts.
In the event of an odd number, n − 1, nodes forming a group, up to b(n − 1)/2c small

groups will form, leaving one node temporarily out. Once a group has been formed, this
last node will join to a group after a response to their JoinRequest has been received.
Again, these sub-groups could homogonize and form a larger group via group merging.
See Appendix B.1 for an example of three-party Genesis.

5.3 Inner Workings Of Key Agreement
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Tree-Based Agreement
In tree-based agreement designs, a logical tree maintains membership and keying information. This implementation employs an array-based storage system, and therefore
must also maintain proper relationships among indices (left child of index n is at 2n + 1,
right child is at index 2n + 2, and a nodes’ parent (if n 6= 0) resides at index b(n − 1)/2c.

As compared with a reference-based implementation, an array-based design was both
simpler from the perspectives of design and implementation, and proved computationally more efficient. Recursively defined methods to prune and graft subtrees provide a
highly efficient and correct solution.
It is important to note that this binary tree must grow at the root when a pre-join tree
is complete and full. Growing downward presents an issue of non-paired children, and
is therefore unable to compute an intermediate key. Growing at the root inserts a new
root and new right subtree, preserving a pairwise key association.
Any specific intermediate private key within the tree is easily computed with specific
knowledge of the children at that tree position. The public key from one child and the
private key from the other, and through the workings of a standard Diffie-Hellman key
agreement round, will generate a shared key, recoverable by both parties.
This implementation of the tree provides two methods used specifically in group key
generation – getRootPath and getRootCoPath. These concepts are described in [24].
The getRootPath method traverses the tree from a specified node to the tree root, returning the nodes on the most direct root-ward path. The getRootCoPath method also
traverses the tree starting from a specific node. Instead of generating a list of linearly
traversed nodes, a list of ancestral neighbors is formed and returned. From these two
lists, the parental private key is generated.
Below is the pseudocode for the tree-based key agreement mechanism as provided in
this work.
Node[] path = getRootPath()
Node[] coPath = getRootCoPath()
for i = path.length-1 to 1 {
path[i-1].keyPair = doAgreement(path[i].getPrivateKey(),
coPath[i].getPublicKey())
}
PrivateKey groupKey = path[0].getPrivateKey()

It is critical to remember that a public key is a function of a private key value. To
this end, once a private intermediate key has been generated, an associated public key
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must be built that is mathematically related to this private value. For both key styles
investigated in this work, this meant reaching into other source code. The code from
the EC provider was easily ported into this work, but the JCE DSA/RSA key functions
required a great deal more effort.

5.4 Member Operations With Existing Group
Post-formation group operations are somewhat more simplified than similar operations
done during genesis. Several group-level opeations are defined for this environment
– member join, member leave, group merge and group partition. Only the two single
member events have been implemented in this work.
When a node announces their desire to join a group, each node tentatively adds the
joining member to their group. Only one member, however, will respond and initiate a
conversation with the joining member. Key algorithm parameters are sent (by JoinGrant
message), a public key is received (via NewKey message), and the key tree is re-calculated
and redistributed (by an AgreeSet message) to the group by this sponsor. This recalculation process includes the sponsor generating a new random keypair to use in the
generation of the new tree. Figure 5.1 shows this event graphically.

Figure 5.1: Member Join event
Conversely, when a member announces their intentions to leave the group (via a
LeaveRequest message), the sponsor is again identified and charged with the task of

5.5 Signatures
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recalculating and redistributing the key tree. Like member join, the tree recalculation
process includes a new sponsor-local keypair to use in tree recalculation. Figure 5.2
shows this event graphically, and Section B.2 provides a transcript of a MemberLeave
event.

Figure 5.2: Member Leave event
Key update, while not explicitly a member operation, is extremely similar to these
two operations. A member requesting (via KeyUpdate message) a key update will simply broadcast this message to the group. This member’s sponsor will then update the
sponsor-local keys, and recompute and redistribute the key tree. While this does not
change the entire tree, it updates log n keys of the tree, including the final group key.
Additional work to ensure more widespread key freshness could easily be conducted,
such as key age monitoring and periodic key refresh support. Figure 5.3 shows the key
update event graphically.

5.5 Signatures
In theory every message received must be authenticated to ensure message integrity and
sender validation. In practice, however, this is not possible.
During member join, for example, it is impossible for a non-member to generate a
keypair, sign a message, and have the other party validate this signature. The key
algorithm is not homogeneous, and the receiving party does not have a viable validation
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Figure 5.3: Key Refresh event
key. This means that until a member has sent their NewKey message and then become
a member of the group, these messages should not be signed. If they are signed, the
signature should be ignored by the receiving party.
In fact, only messages sent and received as a member of the group should be signed
and verified. This enforces message integrity of all messages that could affect the stability and functioning of the group.

Chapter 6

Cryptographic Evaluation
This chapter will address the computational and mathematical foundations of the two
key generation and digital signature techniques utilized in this resarch.

6.1 RSA/DSA Algorithmics
RSA - Rivest, Shamir, Alderman Authentication Algorithm
RSA was developed at MIT and released to the public in 1977. With the declassification
of government documents in 1977, it was discoverd that British researcher James Ellis
developed RSA-like algorithms in 1972. Due to the secrecy of the algorithms at the time,
Ellis had no copyright privileges.
RSA keys are generated as follows:
1.

With a goal of computing an n-bit key, define large primes p and q where
p and q are of bit-length l where (512 ≤ l ≤ 1024), and l ≈ n/2.

The probability a number pt where pt < n is prime is roughly 6/n, and
therefore a number will be found in roughly n/6 trials. (The number of
primes less than n is roughly n/ ln n, such that the probability of a number
near n being prime is approximately 1/ ln n. Therefore an n/2-bit number
has a probability of roughly 1/ ln 2n/2 . Removing even numbers from this
field results in a probability of a given number close to n/2 being prime
being approximately 6/n).
2.

Compute n as n = pq.

3.

Find e such that e is less than n and relatively prime to (p − 1)(q − 1).

4.

Select another value d such that (ed − 1) is divisible by (p − 1)(q − 1).

The public key value is the value-pair (n, e), and the private key is the value-pair
(n, d).
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DSA - Digital Signature Algorithm
DSA was designed by the United States federal government to be a very fast and effective
signature scheme only. It was later discovered to be a rather effective encryption scheme
(a point designers tried to avoid), but proved to be painfully slow. Released to the public
in 1991, DSA was not welcomed warmly by a security community that had large financial
and technological investments in RSA.
DSA keys are generated as follows:
1.

Generate one 160-bit and one 1024-bit prime number as q and p respectivly, ensuring q divides p − 1.

2.

Compute g = h(p−1)/q mod p for an h in the cyclic group defined by p.

3.

The private key is x and the public key y = g x mod p for a random x in
1 ≤ x ≤ q − 1.

6.1.1 The Strength of RSA/DSA Schemes
RSA and DSA techniques are based on the difficulty of the Discrete Logarithm Problem
(DLP). That is, it is computationally difficult to compute the private value d from the
public pair (n, e). This would require factoring the value of e mod n into p and q, thereby
providing the path to recovering the private key value d. It is this factoring a large value
into the product of two primes that is the DLP.
The strength of these schemes rests solely on the size of the public key. As [5] reports,
factoring the public key can take only a few hours on a standard PC for key sizes less
than 256 bits, which serves as direct motivation for p to be at least 1024 bits.
As DSA parameters and keys are defined over a cyclic sub-group of the integers,
DSA is theoretically vulnerable to two discrete logarithm attacks. The first is on the
number field itself as defined by the large prime p. Factoring this number will allow
recomputation of the private key value. The general number field seive provides the
best performace for factoring a large prime-product, running in super-polynomial, subexponential time [4]. The second attack uses Pollards-ρ algorithm to compute the value
of x as used in the computation of the keypair. Pollards-ρ algorithm for factoring large
prime p works as follows [6] (See [39] and [7] for more):
1.

Set a = 2 and b = 2.

2.

While not solved and not in error condition, compute a = a 2 + 1 mod p,
b = b2 + 1 mod p, and d = gcd(|a − b|, n). If a solution 1 < d < n is found, p
has been factored into d and p/d. An error surfaces when d = n. Additional

discussion about this algorithm and suggestions for handling this error
condition is available in [6].

6.2 Elliptic Curve Algorithmics
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This algorithm runs in O( (πn)/2) time, and recent work to parallelize the algorithm
p

has improved it’s performance to O(( (πn)/2)/m) for m processors.
p

6.1.2 Digital Signatures
Given a message m generating a digital signature of m using an RSA/DSA-style private
key n, d is computed as follows. A secure hashing algorithm, such as SHA, is applied to
the message. This generates a constant-length, collision-resistant bit string representative of m. This hash is then encrypted with the private key, which produces the final
message signature. This signature is included in the message as an appendix.
Verification of this signature is the reverse; upon receipt, the signature is decrypted
with the public key share to reveal the hash bit string. The original message, minus the
included signature, is then processed with the same hashing algorithm. The two hashes
are compared, and if equal, verification has passed [5].

6.2 Elliptic Curve Algorithmics
This technique achieves security by being rooted in the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm
Problem (ECDLP). The ECDLP is a subproblem of the DLP, and has been proven more
difficult to solve, thereby offering higher levels of security than the DLP.
Elliptic curves are mathematically defined as a set of points over a number field
(typically the complex, rational, or real numbers) satisfying a cubic curve of genus 1
(one bisecting cut through the curve removes the notions of inside-the-curve and outside-the furve). Elliptic curve equations do not define elliptical paths – they are named
for their relation to elliptic integrals used in the computation of elliptical arc lengths,
and are closely related to the torus. The complex, rational, and real numbers are, by
definition, infinite number fields, whereas the integer family describes an infinite ring
(recall fields are a subset of numerical rings, adding the requirement that the non-zero
elements of a field form an abelian group under multiplication). Additionally, these
number fields (and therefore rings) have the property of either being of characteristic
0 (zero) or of prime characteristic [40]. While other number fields do not share this
property, elliptic curves for use in cryptography, regardless of over which field they are
defined, must be of characteristic zero or prime. (Fields of characteristic not equal to
zero are fields generated by a polynomial or other such functions. All ordered fields are
of characteristic zero.) This ensures an abelian group over addition and multiplication.
Curves are typically defined over a cyclic group of prime order or prime-power-of-two
order. These fields are represented as E Fp for prime-order fields, and EF 2p for poweredorder fields. These fields are each cyclic as they are abelian over addition and multi-
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plication (for any two elements A and B in field F , A  B = B  A where  is the binary

operation of addition or multiplication), and therefore possess a group generator G from
which all elements of the field F may be generated.

Generally elliptic curves (assume characteristic zero), may be written in general form
as y 2 = x3 − ax − b. Curves used in cryptography include a point at infinity. With two

points on the curve, PxP ,yP and QxQ ,yQ , we can then define a third based on the following
rules, where the sum of the three points is the point of infinty, denoted
1.

.

If P 6= Q, R0 is the point defined by drawing a line intersecting the curve
at points P , Q, and R0 .

2.

If the intersecting line is tangential to the curve at either point P or Q,
this point in included twice.

3.

If the connecting line is parallel to the y-axis, the third point is the point
of infinity.

Given an elliptic curve E and two points on this curve, P xP ,yP and QxQ ,yQ , the sum of
these points is PxP ,yP + QxQ ,yQ = Rx0 R ,yR . The point R0 is determined by ’drawing’ a line
segment between PxP ,yP and QxQ ,yQ . This line segment will intersect the curve elsewhere
at a third point, Rx0 R ,yR . Reflecting the y-component of the coordinates of the point R 0
defines the sum-point RxR ,yR .
This translates computationally to (see [41], [2]):
1.

Assume two points PxP ,yP and QxQ ,yQ reside along a curve, and we want
PxP ,yP + QxQ ,yQ = RxR ,yR .

2.

Calculate the slope of the connecting line as s = (P y − Qy )/(Px − Qx ).

3.

If Px 6= Qx , calculate the final coordinates as
Rx = s2 − Px − Qx and

Ry = −Py + s(Px − Rx ).

4.

If, on the other hand Px == Qx , there are two paths:
(a)

If Py = −Qy (a P -Q connecting line would be parallel to the y-axis),
then s = (3Px2 − a)/(2Py ) (recall the value of a is from the curve gener-

ation sequence)

Rx = s2 − Px − Qx and
(b)

Ry = −Py + s(Rx − Px )

Otherwise, as mentioned above in the discussion of the point of infinity, when the y-coordinates of both points match (this can only
happen at the point of infinity or when computing a scalar multiple of
a point), R = 2P = 0.

6.2 Elliptic Curve Algorithmics
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Subtraction of PxP ,yP from RxR ,yR (where PxP ,yP + QxQ ,yQ = RxR ,yR ) is done similarly.
Reflecting the y-component of R point to describe the point R 0 , connecting R0 and Q with
a straight line will describe the point P – the difference between points Q and R.
Scalar multiplication, then, is a series of doublings and additions. Again, with elliptic
curve E and a point PxP ,yP , 2PxP ,yP is simply PxP ,yP + PxP ,yP . We find the point of intersection, QxQ ,yQ , the tangent line at PxP ,yP makes with E, and negate the y-coordinate, giving
us our final point RxR ,yR . It should be noted that 3PxP ,yP is simply 2PxP ,yP + PxP ,yP .
The example is given in [18] of computing 11P for a point P on any curve as 11P =
(2 ∗ ((2 ∗ (2 ∗ P )) + P )) + P (Extra parenthasis are present to force proper mathematical

ordering). This approach works to calculate 11P/2 as quickly as possible with the fewest
calculations. The value of 11P could also be calculated as 11P = (2∗(2∗(2∗P )))+(2∗P )+P ,
but this is clearly not as clean, nor as straighforward to implement, especially with large
coefficients.
This information, along with a great deal of other pertinant information, is explained
in greater depth by [8], [41], [40], [2] and [3].

6.2.1 Prime-Order Elliptic Curves
Curves defined over the prime order group are defined and generated as follows:
1.

Random prime number p greater than 3. The field is then defined over
the integers 0, 1, 2, . . . , p − 1.

Values should be large enough (at least 224 bits) to not fall prey to the
Pohlig-Hellman solution [17] or the birthday attack [1] for solving some
discrete logarithm problems.
2.

Addition of field elements is done as integer addition modp.

3.

Multiplication of field elements is done as integer multiplication modp.

4.

Two field elements, a and b (positive or negative), must satisfy the equation
4a3 + 27b2 6≡ 0(modp).

5.

A generator point G, defined by the coordinates (x G , yG ) that lies on the
curve E.

6.

The number of bits, n, of the point G.

7.

The curve E is then comprised of all points that satisfy the equation y 2 =
x3 + ax + b, with the exception of the point of infinity

, which defines the

additive identity of the curve group.
The number of points along the curve is the order of the curve, repre√
sented as #E(Fp ). The Hasse Theorem defines p + 1 − 2 p ≤ #E(Fp ≤
√
p + 1 + 2 p [7].
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6.2.2 Prime-Power Elliptic Curves
Curves over the prime-power-of-two group are defined as follows:
1.

Prime number p greater than 3. The field is then defined over the integers
of p-bits in length.

2.

Addition of field elements is done as integer addition modp.

3.

Multiplication of field elements is done as integer multiplication modp.

4.

Two field elements, a and b, positive or negative.

5.

The curve E is then comprised of all points, with the exception of the
point of infinity, which satisfy the equation y 2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b.

6.

A generator point G, defined by the coordinates (x G , yG ) that lies on the
curve E.

7.

The number of bits, n, of the point G.

6.2.3 Common Ground
Keys are then generated as follows:
1.

Choose a random value d over the interval (1 . . . , n − 1).

2.

Compute the point Q comprised of the on-curve coordinates (x Q , yQ ) as
Q = dG.

The public key value is Q, and the private key value is d.

6.2.4 The Strength of Elliptic Curve
The Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm problem is simply to find the integer d that represents both the private key value and the factor used in the public key calculation, given
only the final public key value. That is, given Q = dG mod p and G, find the value of d.
Several different types of valid curves exist that have been removed from consideration in generating curves for cryptographic use. These families are so removed as they
have common attributes that are easily exploited, thus violating the security guarantees
of the curve.
Whereas RSA/DSA style keys rely on modular integer exponentiation, elliptic curves
rely on scalar point multiplication. Any even multiple of a point is a sequence of point
doubling, and an odd multiple is a sequence of point doublings and point additions.
On first inspection, the Discrete Logarithm Problem and the Elliptic Curve Discrete
Logarithm Problem seem nearly identical in representation and definition. However, as
[38] explains, through the index calculus attack (the most efficient/successful factoring

6.2 Elliptic Curve Algorithmics
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technique for large primes currently known), a number may be factored by dividing off
prime factors incrementally. Done in a loop until completion, smaller values usually
result from this division. Elliptic curves, on the other hand, do not have this decreasing value guarantee. Subtracting a point with small coordinates with a second smallcoordinate point, may result in a large-value point. It is for this reason that the ECDLP
is considered a subset of the DLP, and computationally harder.
As shown by Figure 6.1, a large division in key sizes for equivalent security is apparent. This shows that elliptic curve-based keys are physically and logically smaller for
equivalent key strength. Table 6.1 shows a tabular form of the same data [18]. These
numbers represent approximate equivalencies in resitstance to brute-force attacks in
efforts to factor the private key value. This is further explained and discussed in [26].

Relative Equivalent Key Sizes
Symmetric Keys vs Elliptic Curves & RSA/DSA/DH Keys
00

150

Elliptic Curve Keys
RSA/DSA/DH Keys

00

Equivalent Key Sizes (bits)

125

00

100

0

750

0

500

0

250

0
64

96

128

160

192

224

Symmetric Key Size (bits)

256

Figure 6.1: Equivalent Key Sizes

Symmetric Key Size

Elliptic Curve Key Size

RSA/DSA Key Size

80

163

1024

128

283

3072

192

409

7680

256

571

15360

Table 6.1: Equivalent key strength comparison
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6.3 Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Techniques
The Diffie-Hellman key agreement algorithm defines a way for two parties to generate
a shared key, independently, without exchanging secret information. This allows these
same two parties to generate a key in the open, and a third party, who has gathered all
exchanges, is unable to generate the same key.
This technique was introducted in 1976 by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman, as
published in “New Horizons in Cryptography” [14], and has served as the cornerstone
technique for two-party key agreement. It has since been generalized with several different variations, some providing authentication and better utilization of certain resources
(see [9]) that work better in multi-party settings.
It is important to note that in no way does the standard Diffie-Hellman key agreement algorithm provide endpoint authentication. That is to say that if Alice and Bob
are exchanging a key, Eve can situate herself between Alice and Bob and play the role
of Bob to Alice, and Alice to Bob. This would allow Eve to view or modify all data sent
between Alice and Bob, and nobody would be any the wiser. This is a man-in-the-middle
attack. Some of the variations mentioned in [9] address these issues, and combining
key agreement with certificate validation is yet another common alternative. While certificates are likely exterior to this kind of computing environment, other key agreement
schemes could be explored.

RSA/DSA Key Agreement
Given two keypairs eα , dα and eβ , dβ , nodes α and β are each able to individually compute
e

the same common shared key, S. Node α computes S α = dαβ mod n, and β computes
Sβ = deβα mod n. In both computations, Sα and Sβ are equivalent. It is clear that a third
party, whom has gathered eα and eβ would compute Sγ = edβα mod n, which is clearly not
the same.

Elliptic Curve Key Agreement
Given two keypairs Qα , dα and Qβ , dβ , nodes α and β are each able to compute ethe same
common shared key, S. Node α computes S α = dα Qβ and β computes Sβ = dβ Qα . In
both computations, Sα and Sβ are equivalent. It is clear that a third party, whom has
gathered Qα and Qβ would compute Sγ = Qα Qβ , which is clearly not the same.
This technique extends to the generalized Diffie-Hellman (GDH) [9] technique applicable to groups through a sequence of two-party agreements.

6.3 Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Techniques
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The math involved in the Diffie-Hellman key agreement algorithm clearly shows the importance of the associative and commutative properties of the integer field for RSA/DSA
algorithms, and abelian groups for elliptic curves.

6.3.1 Tree-Based Key Agreement
As mentioned above, it is imperative that the tree maintain a paired association of nodes
within the tree. This is a direct result of the pair-based key agreement algorithms,
discussed in Section 6.3.
Tree-based agreement is best explained by example. Consider a set of nodes 1, 2, 3, . . . , n
wishing to form a group. As per the genesis protocol, suppose 1 and 2 form the initial
group. They compute a shared key S1:2 as described above, saving the value in an intermediate parent tree node. When 3 joins, 3 computes a common key S (1:2):3 in the pairwise
fashion. This value is then saved as a new intermediate parental node to both the 1 : 2
node and 3 node. This generates a common secret key, i.e. private key. To provide a
public key value at this node, a random public key (yet algabraically related to the private key) is generated and stored. This intermediate public key is generated from and by
identical key material as any non-intermediate (i.e., node) keypair. As such, it is just as
secure and provides equivalent security utility as any other key in the framework. With
a group size of at least three members, this calculation is done by the tree sponsor (see
Section 5.4) and then distributed to all group members. A two-member group does not
need this distribution as each member is computing the same final key. As additional
members join the group, the tree grows at the root, and fills in a top-to-bottom, left-toright manner. For example, when N 4 joins the group, the tree is rearranged so that the
root node has two intermediate childen. The left child of root is parent to nodes N 1 and
N 2 , and the right of root child is parent to nodes N 3 and N 4 . The value of the final group
key with four members is (with SN 1−2 computed by N 1 and SN 3−4 computed by N 3 ):
If S1:2 = (d1 Q2 ) and S3:4 = (d3 Q4 ), then S1:4 = (dS1:2 QS3:4 ) = (dS3:4 QS1:2 )
Each node would compute the key as follows:
1 computes S1:4 as (d1 S2 )QS3:4
2 computes S1:4 as (d2 S1 )QS3:4
3 computes S1:4 as (d3 S4 )QS1:2
4 computes S1:4 as (d4 S3 )QS1:2
By leveraging the mathematical properties of the binary tree, we can efficiently compute a common group key in log n agreement rounds for an n-member group. There are
issues surrounding this technique, discussed briefly in Section 8.2, and further in [19].
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Section 5.4 outlines these processes in additional detail.

Part III

Conclusions

Chapter 7

Performance
The goal of this research was to support the claim that elliptic curve keys were more
suitable for small devices than RSA/DSA-style keys, but not at the cost of security.

Relative Equivalent Key Sizes
Symmetric Keys vs Elliptic Curves & RSA/DSA/DH Keys
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224
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Figure 7.1: Equivalent Key Sizes
Additionally, a key strength sufficient for our needs, yet not suseptible to compromise
must be identified. While the framework implemented in the thesis is targeted at small
devices, there is no stipulation that larger systems cannot participate in the group.
This larger system may have facilities to attack weak cryptography, so our cipher must
be mathematically and computationally strong. Figure 7.1 shows the growth rates in
security of both RSA/DSA-style keys and EC keys for the most common symmetric key
sizes.
In [11], the authors point out that an elliptic curve key is proportional to an RSA/DSA

Page 56

Chapter 7. Performance

Key Size vs. Computable Strength
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Figure 7.2: Computability comparison and key strength
style key according to the equation:
n = βN 1/3 (ln(N ln(2)))2/3
where β ≈ 4.91, and N is the RSA/DSA key size. The value of β is also fully explained in

[11].

This ratio generalizes the size-strength differences between RSA/DSA- and elliptic
curve-based keys to show that curve based systems grow slightly faster than the cube
root of DSA/RSA key sizes while maintaining approximately equal strength.

7.1 General Key Generation
The following two graphs, Figures 7.4 and 7.5, plot the maximum, minimum, and average times needed to generate a keypair using the two different techniques (RSA/DSA vs
elliptic curve), over varying key sizes. It is clear from the data that generating a JCE key
(RSA/DSA style) can take significantly longer than an elliptic curve-based key.
Times are tallied from a series of ten key generations for each key size, with times
reflecting JCE provider load and general initialization removed.
Figure 7.3 shows the DER-encoded (serialized) sizes of the various key sizes for both
algorithms. Smaller is better, as the lengths represented are per-key sizes as transferred
during key serialization operations.

7.2 Digital Signatures

Page 57

Public Key Size Comparison
Elliptic Curve (Field P) DH keys vs JCE-DH keys
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Figure 7.3: DER-Encoded Public Key Size Comparison

7.1.1 EC-Based Keys
Figure 7.4 is shows times needed to generate various F p -field keys. The tested version of
the FlexiECProvider [16] does not support curves over the F2p field.

7.1.2 JCE Keys
The timing values are shown in Table 7.3; key sizes are in bits, times are measures of
seconds. It is clear that JCE keys can take from thirty seconds to seven-plus minutes
to generate on a desktop system. Also important to note with Figure 7.5 is that the
y-axis is logarithmic. The disparity between times for RSA/DSA and elliptic curve keys
is made very evident by the composite graph, Figure 7.6. The sizes for EC-based keys
have been adjusted (according to [26]) to reflect similar cryptographic strength as their
RSA counterparts (i.e., a 160-bit elliptic-curve key is approximately cryptographically
equivalent to a 1024-bit RSA key).

7.2 Digital Signatures
The other significant part of this work is the digital signature utilization investigation.
The following graphs plotting signature timing performance was based on the following
test routines: at 1024-byte increments, starting at 1024 bytes and progressing to one
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Elliptic Curve Key Generation Time
Sparc Ultra 10, 256M Ram, JDK 1.4.0
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Figure 7.4: EC key generation timings
megabyte, generate random data of proper length. Time the signature update and signing phases for one hundred iterations. All tests use the same key, and timing does not
include random data generation. All tests at each data-length use the same random
data. The tests were conducted on a Sun Sparc Ultra 10, and an AMD Athlon MP 1800+
to help ensure performance results are platform independent.
Digital signatures first reduce an arbitrary-length data stream to a fixed-length stream
using a message digest hashing technique. This is typically done with SHA or the one
of the classic MD alogrithms (MD4, MD5). This constant-length hash value is then encrypted with the private signature key. This provides a collision-resistant base to encrypt
in constant time, with linear overall complexity (linear in data length for hashing).
SHA operates on blocks of data, padding to a fixed size as needed. The Java implementation of SHA as called from both signature schemes is SHA-1 (see [27] for more
about SHA-1).

7.2.1 Architecture 1 - Sparc
Sun Sparc Ultra 10, with 256 megabytes of memory using JDK 1.4.0 running Solaris 9.
This was the initial testbed for this examination.
Visible in the following graphs (Figures 7.8 and 7.9), there are operations within
SHA that cause severe performance degredation on this platform. These may include
data swapping or caching events. Comparativly, in graphs from the second architecture

7.2 Digital Signatures
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RSA/DSA Key Generation
Sparc Ultra 10, 256M Ram, JDK 1.4.0
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Figure 7.5: JCE key generation timings
(Figures 7.15 and 7.16), these influences are less visible, and the blocking process is
clearly visible in the stepping advancement of the datapoints.
Figure 7.7 shows all three (minimum, average, and maximum) times for total signature generation on the Sparc-based system using EC-based signatures.
Figure 7.8 shows the minimum and average times for both the hashing and encryption phases on the Sparc-based system using EC-based signatures.
Figure 7.9 shows the maximum times for both the hashing and encryption phases on
the Sparc-based system for EC signatures.
Figure 7.10 shows all three (minimum, average, and maximum) times for total signature generation on the Sparc-based system using RSA-based signatures.
Figure 7.11 shows the minimum and average times for both the hashing and encryption phases on the Sparc-based system using RSA/DSA-style signatures.
Figure 7.12 shows the maximum times for both the hashing and encryption phases
on the Sparc-based system using RSA/DSA-style signatures.
Figure 7.13 clearly shows the performance differences (based on average times) of
EC- and RSA-based digital signature schemes on the Sparc system.

7.2.2 Architecture 2 - AMD
AMD Athlon MP 1800+, with 512 megabytes of memory using JDK 1.4.2 running the
Linux 2.6.5 kernel. With the results from the Sparc-based tests, this examination was
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Key Generation Times - Composite
Sparc Ultra 10, 256M RAM, JDK 1.4.0
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Figure 7.6: Key generation timings

performed to determine the influences of the machine architecture. It is clear from the
following graphs there are some aspects of this signature process that are influenced by
the system, not just overall procesing speed.
Figure 7.14 shows all three (minimum, average, and maximum) times for total signature generation on the AMD-based system using EC-based signatures.
Figure 7.15 shows the minimum and average times for both the hashing and encryption phases on the AMD-based system using EC-based signatures.
Figure 7.16 shows the maximum times for both the hashing and encryption phases
on the AMD-based system for EC signatures.
Figure 7.17 shows all three (minimum, average, and maximum) times for total signature generation on the AMD-based system using RSA-based signatures.
Figure 7.18 shows the minimum and average times for both the hashing and encryption phases on the AMD-based system using RSA/DSA-style signatures.
Figure 7.19 shows the maximum times for both the hashing and encryption phases
on the AMD-based system using RSA/DSA-style signatures.
Figure 7.20 clearly shows the performance differences (based on average times) of
EC- and RSA-based digital signature schemes on the AMD system.

7.3 Conclusions
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EC-Based Digital Signature Generation
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Figure 7.7: EC-Based Signature Timing - Min, Max, Avg (Sparc)

7.3 Conclusions
From this research, it is clear that elliptic curve keys are more suited for a computationallylimited network environment than RSA/DSA style keys. Faster generation times and
simpler algorithmics place substantially less strain on small devices, and make group
participation possible.
Furthermore, the ability to compute and verify digital signatures with the same keypair is a feature other key generation styles simply cannot provide due to their mathematical roots. This reduces key distribution and synchronization costs by half within
the group, and provides an easy way for any group member to update the group key at
any time.
An intelligent key agreement scheme and inner-group maintenance protocol ensures
group stability as well as perfect forward and backward secrecy. Using the same keys
for both key agreement and digital signatures requires all members possess a current
and complete view of the group; this further promotes group-wide stability and security
as no one member holds a monopoly on the groups’ cryptographic core.
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EC-Based Digital Signature Generation
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Figure 7.8: EC-Based Signature Timing - Min, Avg (Sparc)

EC-Based Digital Signature Generation
Sparc Ultra 10, 256M RAM, JDK 1.4.0
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Figure 7.9: EC-Based Signature Timing - Max (Sparc)
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Key Size

Miminum Time

Average Time

Maximum Time
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3222

3284
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4509

4578
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5305
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5529

5626

5727
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6926
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Table 7.1: Elliptic Curve Key Generation Timings
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Key Size

Miminum Time

Average Time

Maximum Time
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Table 7.2: Elliptic Curve Key Generation Timings (cont.)

Key Size

Miminum Time
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Table 7.3: JCE Key Generation Timings
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RSA-Based Digital Signature Generation
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Figure 7.10: RSA-Based Signature Timing - Min, Max, Avg (Sparc)

RSA-Based Digital Signature Generation
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Figure 7.11: RSA-Based Signature Timing - Min, Avg (Sparc)
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RSA-Based Digital Signature Generation
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Figure 7.12: RSA-Based Signature Timing - Max (Sparc)

Digital Signature Generation Comparison
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Figure 7.13: Signature Timing Comparison - Avg (Sparc)
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EC-Based Signature Generation
AMD MP 1800+, 512M RAM, JDK 1.4.2, Linux 2.6.5
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Figure 7.14: EC-Based Signature Timing - Min, Max, Avg (AMD)

EC-Based Signature Generation
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Figure 7.15: EC-Based Signature Timing - Min, Avg (AMD)
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EC-Based Signature Generation
AMD MP 1800+, 512M RAM, JDK 1.4.2, Linux 2.6.5
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Figure 7.16: EC-Based Signature Timing - Max (AMD)

RSA-Based Signature Generation
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Figure 7.17: RSA-Based Signature Timing - Min, Max, Avg (AMD)
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RSA-Based Signature Generation
AMD MP 1800+, 512M RAM, JDK 1.4.2, Linux 2.6.5
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Figure 7.18: RSA-Based Signature Timing - Min, Avg (AMD)

RSA-Based Signature Generation
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Figure 7.19: RSA-Based Signature Timing - Max (AMD)
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Digital Signature Generation Comparison
AMD MP 1800+, 512M RAM, JDK 1.4.2, Linux 2.6.5
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Figure 7.20: Signature Timing Comparison - Avg (AMD)

Chapter 8

Future Work
8.1 Authentication and Access Control
As mentioned in the introduction, user authentication and access control is somewhat
outside the scope of this thesis. However, in an effort to describe a complete security
framework, a brief mention will be made here.
It is clear that in a serverless environment, reliance upon a database of any form of
usernames and passwords is prohibited. This database would need to be replicated to
every node and painfully kept current. It is very clear that password-based authentication simply will not suffice in this paradigm.
Digital certificates, on the other hand, would provide a more robust and scalable
system for user authentication. A user would generate a certificate, and have the appropriate third parties (such as departments, organizations, etc.) sign this certificate,
building a hierarchy and web of authentication as needed. When joining a group, the
user could present this certificate, and the other nodes could quickly and safely asertain the validity of the users credentials. The third party signatures that were gathered
would serve to provide an access control list feature; if a particular network group is
established requiring certain credentials and a certificate is presented without that the
proper signatures, the certificate is rejected and the user is unable to join. This form
of access control and user authentication is similar to techniques used in popular web
server software, and is further described in [34].
Of course, this is not without technical difficulties as well. These certificates would
need to be relatively short-lived to maintain correct access control. Resouce changes (ie
people moving between departments or projects) would need to be reflected in these certificate signing chains. Revocation lists and proper signing sequences would need to be
maintained, and each device would need to be synchronized with these changes. While
somewhat better than the user-password database, there are many commonalities.
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8.2 Key Agreement
There are clearly several choices for the key agreement system employed by a tool such
as this research, each with strengths and weaknesses.

Tree-based
1.

Structure of n group members has n − 1 intermediate values for a total
of 2n − 1 total keys. Each of these keys must be deserialized from bytes

into key objects before agreement begins, regardless of which keys are

required for agreement.
2.

Determination of group key for any member is computed in log 2 n agreement rounds (from members’ position in the tree to the tree root), and with
n members in the group, this becomes n log 2 n total group-wide agreement
rounds.

Array-based/Linear
1.

Structure of n group members has no intermediate keys.

2.

Determination of final group key requires n rounds for each node with
a final calculation to determine members’ share of final key, resulting in
(n2 ) + 1 total group-wide calculation rounds.

Depending on primary resource concerns, choice of key structure is core to overall
performance. A more network-aware protocol should likely use a linear model to optimize network utilization. On the other hand, a protocol where network latency and
bandwidth are bountiful and computational power is limited, a more two dimensional
approach would be more appropriate to limit the number of agreement rounds required
by each node to compute the final group key.
A tree-based design was chosen for this thesis work as the target platform for the
framework is small devices. In general, network access and communication requires little computational effort, whereas key generation and computation is relatively intensive.
Minimizing computation at the expense of increased network utilization fits well into the
small device requirement and ability set.

8.3 Protocol Features
The stability of the tree-based agreement structure is solid for single-member operations,
as demonstrated by numerous performance and functionality tests. However, multimember operations (group merge or partition) place hurdles in our path.

8.4 Multi-MTU Message Transfer Techniques
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A feature of the protocol, other work such as [19] has been done to alleviate these
issues with respectable results.
Additionally, this thesis work does not include provisions for dealing with silent member leave events due to proximity restrictions or battery life.

8.4 Multi-MTU Message Transfer Techniques
In a TCP-based network setting, reliability and ordering issues are resolved by transparent protocols such as sliding window. These protocols are conversational — one
party will send a message or messages, and the receiver will respond in an affirmational
manner.
In a multicast or broadcast setting these techniques are entirely the wrong approach.
A message broken into m sub-messages, each one MTU long, sent to n group members
results in m ∗ n replies; more if any messages need to be resent due to network failures.

This is clearly not a scalable solution.

8.4.1 Java’s JRMS Package
Work has been done, as reflected in the Java Reliable Multicast Service (JRMS) package
[28], to make multicast communications reliable. It would be entirely possible to use the
LRMP (Light-Weight Reliable Multicast Protocol) profile from JRMS as a communication
system framework for this codebase.

8.4.2 Resend with ACK-NACK
Another technique investigated briefly during the course of this work was one of repeated transmissions. It was observed that with twenty percent network delivery failure
rate, resending a message three times ensured with a great degree of certainty that all
members received the message. It is clear, however, that sending every message three
times results in a three-fold inflation of network requirements. Lossier network systems
requiring additional resends would only worsen these requirements, forming a cyclic
dependency.
A manageable solution for multi-MTU messages is a combination resend-ACK/NACK
system. Single MTU messages could simply be rebroadcast multiple times. Multiple
MTU messages, on the other hand, could be reliably transfered using a resend threshold
followed by a sequence of NACK-driven transfers.
Consider the following scenario. A message, msg, is 10 MTU long, with a resend
threshold and resend counter values of three, and the aforementioned network environment with eighty percent delivery rate of UDP datagrams. Submessages of MTU-length
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each are each sequenced as submessages of a larger message; this ensures proper reassembly ordering upon receipt. Submessage zero has some record of the total number
of submessages needed to represent the complete message.
Submessages zero through two (the first three) are sent serially three times. (This
could be done in a 0-0-0, 1-1-1, 2-2-2 pattern or 0-1-2, 0-1-2, 0-1-2 pattern. It is likely,
however, the latter pattern would afford a higher level of group-wide receipt of the whole
message sequence as there are three distinct time periods in which receiption of the
entire message sequence is possible.) This ensures, with reasonable certainty, that all
members will receive some part of this message. Receipt of any part of these first three
triggers a response acknowledging receipt of these messages. Each node would respond
to the sender to this affect, and resends would be performed to be sure each node has
these three leading submessages. Now that all nodes know the total submessage count,
these remaining blocks can be bundled and retransmitted. This process continues until
all messages are cleanly transferred and not answered with NACK messages. This is
an approximation of TCP’s best-effort transfer approach, simply taken from a reverse
perspective. Any node missing a submessage or range of submessages would simply
reply to the sender to this effect; these NACKs could be collected over a short time period
and unique requests be retransferred.
This attempts to find a harmony between network communication and reliability
constructs — reliable transfer of submessages needs to be ensured to guarantee full and
complete reconstruction of larger messages, yet must keep network communication to a
minimum for efficiency and speed purposes.
This technique works equally well for point-to-point transfers, such as initial key tree
delivery to a joining member, and broadcast transfers, such as setting a new key tree for
the entire group.
The number of submessages resent and the number of times these messages are
resent would each need to be configurable. Some analysis of live-network performance
could be done to modify these control points to provide more real-time performance
improvements. These controls are related to the flow control and collision control aspects
of networking; tuning these approaches TCP-like governances.
Some foundational work was done along these lines to support multi-MTU messages
during the key distribution phase of the protocol with some performnce and applicability
testing. This was later abandoned in the interest of time and research scope.

8.4.3 Stream Control Transmission Protocol
Defined in RFC 2960 [36] and enhanced by RFC’s 3309 [37] and 3436 [20], Stream
Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) could provide an answer to multicast multi-MTU

8.5 Key Distribution
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messaging in a group setting. SCTP provides reliable transmission of messages over an
unreliable, connectionless network link.

8.5 Key Distribution
Once a key has been decided upon (leaving agreement aside for a moment) the next step
is distribution of the key. In a contributory system where each member of the group
influences the final key in some way, each member really only needs a small value of the
final key – specifically their modified contribution. This is different from a server-based
key management system where each node would need the full key, and other contributory systems where different requirements apply. Linear agreement, for example, would
require each node possess the entire chain, whereas hypercubic agreement would only
require a subset of the whole cube.
Trees provide a road map for each node to determine which other pieces of the tree
are required. In general terms, if nodes were not simply at the leaves but within the tree
structure as well, any intermediate node would simply need to send 1 − numberOf Imme-

diateChildren values to each child (clearly the correct block to the correct subtree). This

continued division and uncoupling of values from the other blocks of the key provides a
framework where all nodes get all the messages they require to build the key, and only
these messages. A side effect of this technique is that if a subset of nodes do not receive
the new key, they each send NACK messages. The root node would then package the
corresponding values into one message and broadcast this message to the entire group.
Those not needing or expecting a rekeying message would simply ignore this broadcast.
It is also possible that agreement paradigms do not distribute the entire key management structure to all group members. In this case, it is advisable to distribute the
current structure to or maintain recent versions of the structure with several members.
This promotes general group stability and availability. The redundant nature of distribution in this sense allows for a higher rate of failure survivability.

8.6 Improved Network Performace
A goal of computing in general is improving performance across the board. We can
improve computation by using efficient algorithms, but network communication and
utilization provides a second area of opportunity for performance enhancement.
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8.6.1 Key Improvements
Analysis of the keys that are transported during the protocol phases reveals an interesting optimization opportunity. Each key transports a great deal of the key generation parameter information. While this might be important for blind key agreement techniques
where each party does not know the parameters, this environment requires parameters
be public. Key material could be separated from the parameter data and transported for
a simple optimization. This would require object construction on the receivers side for
each key, but this is, in a sense, already occuring.

8.6.2 Compression
Additionally, an excellent way to improve network performance is a decrease in network
traffic. If a group is willing to take the additional computational impact, all messages
could easily be compressed using a high-speed compression routine. Simply reducing
the data on the network will improve overall network performance.
For implementation and integration purposes, compression could easily be implemented as a modular edu.rit.m2mp.security.Channel class and utilized in any program harnessing the M2MI/M2MP framework. This would allow transparent compression and decompression of messages as each message passes through the Channel.

Part IV

Appendices

Appendix A

Design and Specification
A.1 Message Hierarchy

Figure A.1: Message Structure Heirarcy
Figure A.1 clearly shows that all messages are of type GroupMessage, and all extend
the groupMessageImpl object. This provides a uniform pattern for serialization and
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deserialization at both ends of communication. The methods in each message object,
then, are minimal and provide only very specific operations. The JoinRequest and
JoinGrant messages, for example, have functionality to correctly unpack and evaluate
key parameters.
The vast majority of these objects extend AdminMessage; this was done in an effort
to quickly multiplex messages based initially on object type. This also provides prompt
tagging and identification of messages that could potentially modify the state and functioning of a group node or the entire group.
The ACK and NACK messages are not used in this implementation, but were implemented with the intention of utilization in a more reliable transmission system.

A.2 System Design
The edu.rit.m2mp.security.utils package is used in several places throughout the
system, and is thus excluded from Figure A.2.
This shows the high-level relationships between the various modules comprising this
work. Some functionality, such as the KeyProxy is acts as an inter-object channel, and
eliminates the need for passing method calls through the reactor.
It is clear from the diagram that the reactor is the core of this system; all other
modules work in direct conjunction with this centerpiece.
Table A.1 shows the correspondance of module to package name. The Communications and the Marshalling/Messages modules rely heavily on code from the edu.rit.m2mp.securityu̇tils package. The edu.rit.m2mp.securityṡigntures.hors and edu.rit.m2mp.security.keyagree packages rely heavily on the edu.rit.m2mp.security.keycommon package for key processing and manipulation functionality.
Module Name

Package Name

Communications

edu.rit.m2mp.security.comm

Ciphers

edu.rit.m2mp.security.crypto

Marshalling/Messages

edu.rit.m2mp.security.messages

Signatures

edu.rit.m2mp.security.signatures

Agreement

edu.rit.m2mp.security.keyagree

Channel

edu.rit.m2mp.security
Table A.1: Module to Package Name Mapping

A.3 Network Design
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Figure A.2: High-level System Design

A.3 Network Design

Figure A.3 shows the message flow patterns for messages being read from and written
to the netowrk. The module layout is the same as in Section A.2.
It is clear that messages read from the network must first pass through the decryption module, message deserialization, signature verification, and finally to the processing phase for complete validation. Messages written to the network are first properly
wrapped, digitally signed, serialized, encrypted, and then written to the network.
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Figure A.3: Flow Pattern for Messages

A.4 Message Payload Format
All messages’ payload region is by default a zero-length buffer with no specified format. For security-layer messages, the message type field (see Figure 4.1) identifies the
intention of the message, and no payload is necessary. Exception to this rule are the
JoinRequest and JoinGrant messages, outlined below.

A.4.1 JoinRequest
Start Byte

Byte Count

0

1

1

>1

Description
Security mode value
Encoded algorithm parameters

Table A.2: JoinRequest Message Payload Structure

The security mode value field consists of the digital signature algorithm, cryptography
algorithm, and the encryption mode values bitwise-OR’ed together.

A.4 Message Payload Format
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A.4.2 JoinGrant
Start Byte

Byte Count

0

1

Security mode value

1

1

Key agreement style

2

>1

Description

Encoded group algorithm parameters

Table A.3: JoinGrant Message Payload Structure

As with the JoinRequest message, the Security mode value field consists of the digital
signature algorithm, cryptography algorithm, and the encryption mode values bitwiseOR’ed together.
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Appendix B

Example Events
The following pages are transcript of three network nodes coming online and forming a
group using this framework. Digital signatures are enabled, and 112-bit elliptic curve
keys defined over a prime-order field are used for both generating the common encryption key and digital signature generation and validation.
In the transcript, messages sent are denoted with a ’<-’ prefix, and received mesages
are prefixed with ’->’. Each message is reported in plaintext in the transcript, and several
points of interest are breifly commented on.
The processing of each event is done simultaneously on different nodes; these commentaries are designed to help link common times in different nodes.

B.1 Three-Party Genesis
This example uses the elliptic curve-based key scheme, and public and private values are
displayed when possible. These are verbose transcripts of a three-party group formation,
showing the timeout and deadlock prevention at Genesis.

Join Grant [Alone:Ready] from 1841218574

Join Request [??:??] from -700664168

Tree Set Done [Tree Wait:Tree Wait] from 1841218574

Generated (-):

Null check -- private: false public: false

[001](1841218574) P-

[000](INT) Pp

[002](812015266) Pp

Agreement -- Doing pair-wise agreement ... ... (Null inter. key: false)... building full

(1841218574) agreePub: (65bfd7905186bd6f8e136e1f02a5, 27fcebac500b59483785d2f437c)

1) (812015266) agreePriv: 1050796328272654493276722266390633

Member keypair: Priv: 1050796328272654493276722266390633 Pub: (da1db9afe6654ab53ad2e3fef331, aa38cb36dc81b9db009f676fe300)

Agreement -- Generating Public Key... ...((da1db9afe6654ab53ad2e3fef331, aa38cb36dc81b9db009f676fe300))... done

Agreement -- Generating Public Key... ...((65bfd7905186bd6f8e136e1f02a5, 27fcebac500b59483785d2f437c))... done

Agreement -- Generating Public Key... ...((82117b1573da23ff52d91e800b58, 834d7b6882a7fdb32e9771dc05be))... done

Agreement -- Instantiating KeyFactory object [’EC-GF(P)’/EC: true] ...[ECDH] done

-> (812015266)

As this node is currently joining to another node, this request is ignored.

-> (812015266)

Sending 181-byte ’New Key’ to 812015266

<- New Key [Tree Wait:TreeWait] Set Key Type to ’EC-GF(P)’

>> Generating local keypair (’EC-GF(P)’)... ... ... ... ... setting in tree ... ... done

Agreement -- Saved Algorithm Parameters

Agreement -- Initialized object with encoded form

Agreement -- Obtained AlgorithmParameters object [ECDSA/1]

Agreement -- Parameter algorithm: ’EC-GF(P)’ - 1

-- Locked to joining sponsor ’1841218574’

-> (812015266)

*Ping*

Discovery -- JoinRequest message is 136 bytes long

Launching discovery service... ... ... ... done

Node 1, Member ID 812015266
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Public: (82117b1573da23ff52d91e800b58, 834d7b6882a7fdb32e9771dc05be)

Join Request [Member:Ready] from -700664168

-> (812015266)

New Key [Member:Key Wait] from -700664168

Null check -- private: false public: false

[003](1841218574) P-

[001](INT) Pp

[004](812015266) Pp

[000](INT) --

[002](-700664168) P-

Agreement -- Doing pair-wise agreement ... ... (Null inter. key: false)... building full

(1841218574) agreePub: (65bfd7905186bd6f8e136e1f02a5, 27fcebac500b59483785d2f437c)

2) (812015266) agreePriv: 832149759619182116166361727456452

Member keypair: Priv: 832149759619182116166361727456452 Pub: (bfe5cb35c852648723f482792830, 7ddd4e6db45a5b27f4acc2c0ad51)

>> Generating local keypair (’EC-GF(P)’)... ... ... ... setting in tree ... ... done

Agreement -- Adding ’-700664168’; I’m the sponsor

Agreement -- Generating Public Key... ...((65a47e5ffd3d5a3038ebfafb8daa, 50329dc17cecf1d9c03e2a0c5c91))... done

-> (812015266)

Sending signed 173-byte ’Join Grant’ to 812015266

<- Join Grant [Member:Key Wait] to -700664168 with key type ’EC-GF(P)’/ECDSA

Join Request [??:??] from -700664168

-> (812015266)

A new two-party group has been formed with a common private key. See page 90 for related state in other node.

Sending signed 56-byte ’Tree ACK’ to 812015266

<- TreeAck (New Membership Established) [Member:Ready] ()

Agreement (Regenerate) -- New Group Key: 933980835093847954208274598523293

[001](1841218574) P-

[000](INT) Pp

[002](812015266) Pp

Done with tree regeneration

*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-

0) Private: 933980835093847954208274598523293

B.1 Three-Party Genesis
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Public: (b60119ba8bd11f061cce7fe75ea6, 20687107b99377aa31a545cf2e86)

Public: (35bf0e81ae36d22af0b6da5f3da9, 1941d8f5f9ce24f8082fb92d57bc)

-> (812015266)

Tree Ack [* * * *:Tree Send] from -700664168

Sending signed 897-byte ’Tree Set Done’ to 812015266

<- Tree Set [Member:Ready] ()

MEMBER ’-700664168’ JOINED -- COMPUTED NEW KEY

Agreement -- New Group Key: 3157289455532251061550979072749584

[003](1841218574) P-

[001](INT) Pp

[004](812015266) Pp

[000](INT) Pp

[002](-700664168) P-

Done with tree regeneration

*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-

0) Private: 3157289455532251061550979072749584

Generated (+):

Null check -- private: false public: false

[003](1841218574) P-

[001](INT) Pp

[004](812015266) Pp

[000](INT) Pp

[002](-700664168) P-

Agreement -- Doing pair-wise agreement ... ... (Null inter. key: false)... building full

(-700664168) agreePub: (65a47e5ffd3d5a3038ebfafb8daa, 50329dc17cecf1d9c03e2a0c5c91)

1) (-2147483648) agreePriv: 797376572626094420889632715207356

*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-

members now exist in the group (leaves of tree), with two intermediate key values.

This shows that a new member is joining the group, and it was the responsibility of this node to compute the new group keying information. Three

1) Private: 797376572626094420889632715207356

Generated (+):
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Join Request [Alone:Ready] from 812015266

-> (1841218574)

Join Request [??:??] from -700664168

New Key [Key Wait:Key Wait] from 812015266

0) Private: 933980835093847954208274598523293

Generated (+):

Null check -- private: false public: false

[001](1841218574) Pp

[000](INT) Pp

[002](812015266) P-

Public: (82117b1573da23ff52d91e800b58, 834d7b6882a7fdb32e9771dc05be)

Agreement -- Doing pair-wise agreement ... ... (Null inter. key: false)... building full

(812015266) agreePub: (da1db9afe6654ab53ad2e3fef331, aa38cb36dc81b9db009f676fe300)

1) (1841218574) agreePriv: 759922428149610828340597588147082

Member keypair: Priv: 759922428149610828340597588147082 Pub: (65bfd7905186bd6f8e136e1f02a5, 27fcebac500b59483785d2f437c)

>> Generating local keypair (’EC-GF(P)’)... ... ... ... setting in tree ... ... done

Agreement -- Adding ’812015266’; I’m the sponsor

Agreement -- Generating Public Key... ...((da1db9afe6654ab53ad2e3fef331, aa38cb36dc81b9db009f676fe300))... done

Agreement -- Instantiating KeyFactory object [’EC-GF(P)’/EC: true] ...[ECDH] done

-> (1841218574)

As this node is currently joining to another node, this request is ignored.

-> (1841218574)

Sending 137-byte ’Join Grant’ to 1841218574

>> Generating local keypair (’EC-GF(P)’)... ... ... ... ... setting in tree ... ... done

-- 812015266 < 1841218574 -- locking partner id & initiating

Join Request [??:??] from 812015266

-> (1841218574)

*Ping*

Discovery -- JoinRequest message is 136 bytes long

Launching discovery service... ... ... ... done

Node 2, Member ID 1841218574

B.1 Three-Party Genesis
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*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-

Tree Ack [* * * *:Tree Send] from 812015266

Join Request [Member:Ready] from -700664168

-> (1841218574)

New Key [Member:Key Wait] from -700664168

the new key tree.

The third member is joining the group, and this node realizes it is not responsible for computing the new group key; it waits for notification (below) of

State: ’Member’ Signed: true

MEMBER ’-700664168’ JOINED -- WAITING FOR NEW KEY

AT THIS POINT, I SHOULD BE BLOCKED & WAITING FOR KEY NOTIFY/SET...

Agreement -- Removing ’-700664168’; I’m NOT the sponsor

AT THIS POINT, I SHOULD BE BLOCKED & WAITING FOR KEY NOTIFY/SET...

Agreement -- Adding ’-700664168’; I’m NOT the sponsor

Agreement -- Generating Public Key... ...((65a47e5ffd3d5a3038ebfafb8daa, 50329dc17cecf1d9c03e2a0c5c91))... done

-> (1841218574)

Sending signed 173-byte ’Join Grant’ to 1841218574

<- Join Grant [Member:Key Wait] to -700664168 with key type ’EC-GF(P)’/ECDSA

Join Request [??:??] from -700664168

-> (1841218574)

A new two-party group has been formed with a common private key. See page 87 for related state in other node.

-> (1841218574)

Sending signed 562-byte ’Tree Set Done’ to 1841218574

<- Tree Set [Member:Ready] ()

MEMBER ’812015266’ JOINED -- COMPUTED NEW KEY

Agreement -- New Group Key: 933980835093847954208274598523293

[001](1841218574) Pp

[000](INT) Pp

[002](812015266) P-

Done with tree regeneration
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Tree Set Done [Member:Ready] from 812015266

Public: (b60119ba8bd11f061cce7fe75ea6, 20687107b99377aa31a545cf2e86)

0) Private: 3157289455532251061550979072749584

Generated (-):

Null check -- private: false public: false

[003](1841218574) Pp

[001](INT) Pp

[004](812015266) P-

[000](INT) Pp

[002](-700664168) P-

Public: (35bf0e81ae36d22af0b6da5f3da9, 1941d8f5f9ce24f8082fb92d57bc)

Agreement -- Doing pair-wise agreement ... ... (Null inter. key: false)... building full

(-700664168) agreePub: (65a47e5ffd3d5a3038ebfafb8daa, 50329dc17cecf1d9c03e2a0c5c91)

1) (-2147483648) agreePriv: 797376572626094420889632715207356

*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-

1) Private: 797376572626094420889632715207356

Generated (-):

Null check -- private: false public: false

[003](1841218574) Pp

[001](INT) Pp

[004](812015266) P-

[000](INT) P-

[002](-700664168) P-

Agreement -- Doing pair-wise agreement ... ... (Null inter. key: false)... building full

(812015266) agreePub: (bfe5cb35c852648723f482792830, 7ddd4e6db45a5b27f4acc2c0ad51)

2) (1841218574) agreePriv: 759922428149610828340597588147082

Member keypair: Priv: 759922428149610828340597588147082 Pub: (65bfd7905186bd6f8e136e1f02a5, 27fcebac500b59483785d2f437c)

Agreement -- Generating Public Key... ...((bfe5cb35c852648723f482792830, 7ddd4e6db45a5b27f4acc2c0ad51))... done

Agreement -- Generating Public Key... ...((65bfd7905186bd6f8e136e1f02a5, 27fcebac500b59483785d2f437c))... done

Agreement -- Generating Public Key... ...((65a47e5ffd3d5a3038ebfafb8daa, 50329dc17cecf1d9c03e2a0c5c91))... done

Agreement -- Generating Public Key... ...((b60119ba8bd11f061cce7fe75ea6, 20687107b99377aa31a545cf2e86))... done

Agreement -- Generating Public Key... ...((35bf0e81ae36d22af0b6da5f3da9, 1941d8f5f9ce24f8082fb92d57bc))... done

-> (1841218574)

B.1 Three-Party Genesis
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Tree Ack [* * * *:Tree Send] from -700664168

Join Grant [Alone:Ready] from 1841218574

Sending 181-byte ’New Key’ to -700664168

<- New Key [Tree Wait:TreeWait] Set Key Type to ’EC-GF(P)’

>> Generating local keypair (’EC-GF(P)’)... ... ... ... ... setting in tree ... ... done

Agreement -- Saved Algorithm Parameters

Agreement -- Initialized object with encoded form

This marks a timeout has occurred. The first request was ignored by all members of the group (see pages 86 and 89), thus prompting a second probe.

*Ping*

Agreement -- Obtained AlgorithmParameters object [ECDSA/1]

Agreement -- Parameter algorithm: ’EC-GF(P)’ - 1

-- Locked to joining sponsor ’1841218574’

-> (-700664168)

*Ping*

Discovery -- JoinRequest message is 136 bytes long

Launching discovery service... ... ... ... done

Node 3, Member ID -700664168

-> (1841218574)

-- (New Key Established) [Member:Ready] ()

Agreement (Regenerate) -- New Group Key: 3157289455532251061550979072749584

[003](1841218574) Pp

[001](INT) Pp

[004](812015266) P-

[000](INT) Pp

[002](-700664168) P-

Done with tree regeneration

*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-
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Tree Set Done [Tree Wait:Tree Wait] from 812015266

Public: (35bf0e81ae36d22af0b6da5f3da9, 1941d8f5f9ce24f8082fb92d57bc)

Sending signed 56-byte ’Tree ACK’ to -700664168

<- TreeAck (New Membership Established) [Member:Ready] ()

Agreement (Regenerate) -- New Group Key: 3157289455532251061550979072749584

[003](1841218574) P-

[001](INT) P-

[004](812015266) P-

[000](INT) Pp

[002](-700664168) Pp

Done with tree regeneration

*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-

0) Private: 3157289455532251061550979072749584

Generated (-):

Null check -- private: false public: false

[003](1841218574) P-

[001](INT) P-

[004](812015266) P-

[000](INT) Pp

[002](-700664168) Pp

Agreement -- Doing pair-wise agreement ... ... (Null inter. key: false)... building full

(-2147483648) agreePub: (b60119ba8bd11f061cce7fe75ea6, 20687107b99377aa31a545cf2e86)

1) (-700664168) agreePriv: 3091192612846610570814386186041749

Member keypair: Priv: 3091192612846610570814386186041749 Pub: (65a47e5ffd3d5a3038ebfafb8daa, 50329dc17cecf1d9c03e2a0c5c91)

Agreement -- Generating Public Key... ...((bfe5cb35c852648723f482792830, 7ddd4e6db45a5b27f4acc2c0ad51))... done

Agreement -- Generating Public Key... ...((65bfd7905186bd6f8e136e1f02a5, 27fcebac500b59483785d2f437c))... done

Agreement -- Generating Public Key... ...((65a47e5ffd3d5a3038ebfafb8daa, 50329dc17cecf1d9c03e2a0c5c91))... done

Agreement -- Generating Public Key... ...((b60119ba8bd11f061cce7fe75ea6, 20687107b99377aa31a545cf2e86))... done

Agreement -- Generating Public Key... ...((35bf0e81ae36d22af0b6da5f3da9, 1941d8f5f9ce24f8082fb92d57bc))... done

Agreement -- Instantiating KeyFactory object [’EC-GF(P)’/EC: true] ...[ECDH] done

-> (-700664168)

B.1 Three-Party Genesis
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The corresponences between Nodes 1 and 2 shows that these formed the initial pairing, and generated share private key 933980835093847954208274598523293. Node 3
was initally admitted to the group by Node 1, who later realized they were not suitable
for sponsorship – this session suffered a timeout, and resumed correctly with Nodes 2
and 3 cooperating to build and distribute the final key, where all three members share
the value 3157289455532251061550979072749584.
Table B.1 and Table B.2 show network utilization for the three-way genesis event.

Node 1 (Writing)
Message Type

Quantity

Size Each

Total

JoinRequest

1

136

136

NewKey

1

181

181

AgreeACK

1

56

56

JoinGrant

1

173

173

AgreeSetDone

1

897

897
1443

Node 2 (Writing)
Message Type

Quantity

Size Each

Total

JoinRequest

1

136

136

AgreeSetDone

1

562

562

JoinGrant

1

173

173
871

Node 3 (Writing)
Message Type

Quantity

Size Each

Total

JoinRequest

2

136

272

NewKey

1

181

181

AgreeACK

1

56

56
509

Table B.1: Communications for 3-Party Genesis - Writing

Totaling the written byte count (Table B.1) gives 2823 sent; totaling the read count
(Table B.2) gives 4057. This disparity is due entirely to the fact that the read count
duplicates messages (ie. the AgreeSetDone and JoinRequest) that are broadcast to the
entire group.

B.2 Member Leave
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Node 1 (Reading)
Message Type

Quantity

Source Node

Size Each

Total

JoinGrant

1

2

137

137

JoinRequest

2

3

136

272

AgreeSetDone

1

2

562

562

NewKey

1

3

181

181

AgreeAck

1

3

56

56

1208
Node 2 (Reading)
Message Type

Quantity

Size Each

Total

JoinRequest

1

1

136

136

JoinRequest

2

3

136

272

AgreeSetDone

1

1

897

897

NewKey

1

1

181

181

NewKey

1

3

181

181

AgreeAck

1

1

56

56

AgreeAck

1

3

56

56
1779

Node 3 (Reading)
Message Type

Quantity

Size Each

Total

JoinGrant

1

2

173

173

AgreeSetDone

1

1

897

897
1070

Table B.2: Communications for 3-Party Genesis - Reading

B.2 Member Leave
This is a continuation of the previous section; one of the three members leaves the group.
The other two then generate a fresh key.

Leave Request [Member:Ready] from 812015266

Tree Set Done [Member:Ready] from -700664168

0) Private: 2490419020422821006423977167652770

Generated (-):

Null check -- private: false public: false

[001](1841218574) Pp

[000](INT) Pp

[002](-700664168) P-

Public: (84bf00ca3f9d4fbc49107f768cae, 4f9ca08f46f54b64277b94701da4)

Agreement -- Doing pair-wise agreement ... ... (Null inter. key: false)... building full

(-700664168) agreePub: (7b8731588421d9475229973a4f3e, 235e2aa47024437967f51d5b140c)

1) (1841218574) agreePriv: 759922428149610828340597588147082

Member keypair: Priv: 759922428149610828340597588147082 Pub: (65bfd7905186bd6f8e136e1f02a5, 27fcebac500b59483785d2f437c)

Agreement -- Generating Public Key... ...((7b8731588421d9475229973a4f3e, 235e2aa47024437967f51d5b140c))... done

Agreement -- Generating Public Key... ...((65bfd7905186bd6f8e136e1f02a5, 27fcebac500b59483785d2f437c))... done

Agreement -- Generating Public Key... ...((84bf00ca3f9d4fbc49107f768cae, 4f9ca08f46f54b64277b94701da4))... done

-> (1841218574)

State: ’Member’ Signed: true

MEMBER ’812015266’ REMOVED -- WAITING FOR NEW KEY

AT THIS POINT, I SHOULD BE BLOCKED & WAITING FOR KEY NOTIFY/SET...

Agreement -- Removing ’812015266’; I’m NOT the sponsor

-> (1841218574)

>> Processing leave request

State: ’Member’ Signed: true

Node 2, Member ID 1841218574

Closing Channel...

Sending signed 52-byte ’Leave Request’ to 812015266

<- Leave Request [Alone:Ready]

Discovery -- Killed...

Node 1, Member ID 812015266
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*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-

Leave Request [Member:Ready] from 812015266

Public: (84bf00ca3f9d4fbc49107f768cae, 4f9ca08f46f54b64277b94701da4)

[002](-700664168) Pp

Done with tree regeneration

*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-

0) Private: 2490419020422821006423977167652770

Generated (+):

Null check -- private: false public: false

[001](1841218574) P-

[000](INT) Pp

[002](-700664168) Pp

Agreement -- Doing pair-wise agreement ... ... (Null inter. key: false)... building full

(1841218574) agreePub: (65bfd7905186bd6f8e136e1f02a5, 27fcebac500b59483785d2f437c)

1) (-700664168) agreePriv: 3357167766165848466468042362884883

Member keypair: Priv: 3357167766165848466468042362884883 Pub: (7b8731588421d9475229973a4f3e, 235e2aa47024437967f51d5b140c)

>> Generating local keypair (’EC-GF(P)’)... ... ... ... setting in tree ... ... done

Agreement -- Removing ’812015266’; I’m the sponsor

-> (-700664168)

>> Processing leave request

State: ’Member’ Signed: true

Node 3, Member ID -700664168

-- (New Key Established) [Member:Ready] ()

Agreement (Regenerate) -- New Group Key: 2490419020422821006423977167652770

[001](1841218574) Pp

[000](INT) Pp

[002](-700664168) P-

Done with tree regeneration

B.2 Member Leave
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After Node 1 left the group, and Nodes 2 and 3 regenerated a common key of 2490419020422821006423977167652770.

Sending signed 560-byte ’Tree Set Done’ to -700664168

<- Tree Set [Member:Ready] ()

MEMBER ’812015266’ REMOVED -- COMPUTED NEW KEY

Agreement -- New Group Key: 2490419020422821006423977167652770

[001](1841218574) P-

[000](INT) Pp
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0x10

0xa0

1.3.6.1.4.1.4447.1

k:

t:

OID:

1) 63e06037c7dab39c91cabc0c9453a31506e71ca9
3) -1efd40d72a06ea9443fa9f660be8dbaf316537c

0) -4795f4bff07881489b434f4764e654d7fb3d280d

2) 43a412bce0d31c3d28da78a5d07cae36a8c876a6

HashID: 2

0x80

l:

hashID: 0x2

Parameters:

Public : Alg: HORS Fmt: X.509 HORS Public Key

Key Information:

* KeyPair generated cleanly

Algorithm: HORS Provider: HORS

KeyPairGenerator Information:

* KeyPairGenerator loaded cleanly

Algorithm: HORS Provider: HORS

KeyPairGenerator Information:

* KeyPairGenerator loaded cleanly

* Provider loaded cleanly (index 6)

HORS Keypair and Key Exchange

Appendix C

23) -3985a3cfd0a2ef6981ead261bdf8aa60e8e9651b

22) 5ef26f0d340aa260a1fc6e7d91533d801b9e2c8c

63) -5fd7908e7942f57421ebd94f3654aa94b41b036d
67) -777e6797a27ff9cb13f20a7a26fc3b853a844694
69) 3b13c05986ef502af6aca1c55b489e47012b7f92

66) -5e19700cdf55320048831a5744cd2f49f58e03aa

68) -7a5f129ad59608faf5b9452c702742b106594689

61) -30f760fcf9f15476cdfdec0f0da65bef682e7eaf

60) 4240cc872f3e93b5666b7cb3db58bab902ae673b

65) 3c39091b28fd0ba2b33176d996e93763338db65f

59) -782edf74b1d010389820c74d78ecdc4c85f1ea43

58) 662a58cea4ea4b754a8929931171e6c9547bbcaf

62) 39e8cd9718701d961a19e5ae6621b6f40a4c9e25

57) 7ae753b035d1a0ef603fc9d7bd8e55eed753f597

56) -141a5bb1d451e7a89a699b738f7f054400dc0785

64) -563666dd1872fb9a90072020de6634da7b36c49f

55) 1065cc7e2d224b564dab8ba934ea3b413b9cad47

47) 768075b6badd1a9cb34b7d1d8c09b3d59af29fbb

46) 5feca3295cf3ba5a92ed8874a9540c8e88d64120

53) -6c7834b348fe06b8cebf4b1dd4d376f2fa6b9dd4

45) 3ad14d3524c49522e9ab79361d8e67dd0b471d5a

44) 39658ed5f3e48cdb882bc9536d2734c61e578eea

54) 41141267c015d74cfc6bc0f6fe1d954c9ea7cf1b

43) -2081243181557450e747d54dbfc1632ba6a6bfa2

42) -4dc9d938851c3de905f8d5bd0cfd776a7946fee8

52) -5bf0ea3e341157c3c6dbad39c01ab7190d6b37d1

41) 58e591b937c22282d4e588fbb3fd5f24f1cfc640

40) 164dc96380cdd533f544b17bb831cd40225ce03b

49) -788175b990707f82ff22a00caada82558bee575b

39) 5e3021df8504ee55715d064965f0d2e1270f8d24

38) -15b661fa7a2d0b9d644545acfab55ec1a5debd98

51) 7216f61dca12f42d38fba374f758fa7a8f9adc76

37) -717a201960acfe5a049f8287c66ecc01d0ccb204

36) 216831bc365dfe4828da40a73c20d50313bb17b6

48) 18d304676b01a613c5db8bd973cffcb63a7b2436

35) -3b6689c1c0081b187eec594d3d35e83e64699cc

34) -6489d22f22f7c3110e404d85681661aaa021bc0b

50) -5e6e1e73accb71a266a4f5e0851acaf8466ac4f0

31) -1064fd69451d255773fe9bd143221ddcd46f716f
33) 7710358ab76c6daf2ab453d1bf6185fba157adda

30) -53dbfa5e2a4b1fe556ee6c1831ab27a7eed91eb

32) -66f77749101fdfa56c35eeebf4769064f53eaf2f

29) 6c72499e279331ebe4036477c68a071675eca8a1

21) 28bd1fb2332cf9a29c5e6a26ca2f0ddee61949fa

20) -66773d6eb6d311a5d85eca0a76a982433d26e90c

28) -572552470f90c642bc6c54f2cd9aa10d5a54f5b

19) -b242363ca0266f35daa5616c2c7ce4198e13d7d

25) -2b38831dc47161777c734db09354f2aaf74434ec

17) 58de25876eec004264e35e59c1db2d8ac51551a5

16) 517f58dd02be4f31c1e38100d5675ead1fa252ac

18) daa3c106e00d7ed43a2fae88ae42bf0aff58294

27) -6b55a1c5a4daa0c55a1d9052c760d6a5e059274d

15) 696ff6a17e804b70ddf8c3620ca2ae7440b4360e

14) -53bb1356c8a6df88b7e5dd00af934655435adaff

24) 6fffcbc5b5c0238b62032795649634c446e6407d

13) -5b6acd7fa4c7a55867ef5626fbfa64a70633256b

26) -4e923d7d0e8494b53bb21636f33ad9202c159759

11) 2134156eee3a976f882ec12069a36ddda51c191c

9) -3eaa0b93da9d835216458e1fe2c8f8ef7f17afbd

12) -63374599d87332df1b71086c56ea5d1ccd800c64

7) 746a27282ce4254649e909cc8dacfd29fe171c2a

6) 4b518cd9e6ea9c94a86b47e1a119621576ad50d3

8) 15393557ea56a4c0a8b6f4c634b63047dcba610

10) -2e90d44cf86313e0c891783fba878acedcff5a00

5) -288ca6e8f82872e2af8672e0043cc876f725a318

4) -37e5606899ee025374dc1d2e82f6ed38c21a0043
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129) 66e9167e844a19cd70fa2f3e13685161e8f31339
131) -34989b263d27ffee6536548b3967b013a29825bb
133) -47a540e187016b064ad470e1055ad0830238e409
135) 582ca45b4351a007d697da4328537345ce2226d3

128) 3bdd09f9c4f3af5b63460f00370b029ca1cdc41f

132) 47aa31e06f4cb013e46d3ed3658358d791627b82

134) 170369967f362948ed1502a94cf9326e3d7e4b5e

127) ae3e49f44b4f517d76152237c37491f585b394b

126) 11d65394f3d33201cae8c4d5ba711dd86831cb95

130) -6a8fce8abc5a53e57e2ea722df7326292b408c01

123) 6bdbcec4f3b28ba42f3a380d7e5bfd70bbf81c2e
125) -3b6d839e31db27f2c1b2f62fd4b24aab2a69b2cf

122) 77ed36fb9638a0df957175937559122afc30c48b

121) 1434d2cfb171fb3759a235b7fbffe6f049d9b09f

124) 77f285b2e201aaecaf34bc2885395c74baf0c64a

119) 275371f394668c63ef8d3964024cd84f610c94a3

118) 5cf5fc8a05a650dbdcf2dd8d5d269a45fa1e16c5

113) -5023b39bc2c8e43d8c6d7952806365b164702634

112) -5f339e1bb95b8c386247d3b5bfaaf4fd46876922

120) 235740cab01b446d6b16e62fa10936687b006e0

111) -45e258f82608f07346fe9ec82e2b6bc39835deee
115) -2cf8413f2e7ea14d7bcefc7415d092583686e6b

109) -49967f3c737a4c6b7793ee4d40e07ba70153e36d

108) -281b7f2240862378f5895374d6003775e08fb36d

110) 59ef895af9768d70cf1393dd10a9ad2af2719c3b

117) 5f397aa55bb8136fd3f115afcdd7d1a231718ddf

107) 48cce375c05ed0b275dd018c33de3178490d7983

114) 1200df78c59fb773000ee9be8a7c09709f088ace

105) 3a6a0159d53f85a9bfd3aeebbff2f1b62b34e0e7

104) -36e89f1b2d5291bea20fa27c6906cf3645532414

106) 38a57e488941f3e1d8161fbd0271d76954692adc

116) 6942811c65890ca2b6f42846506a2a92e8095416

101) 43369ff63fa33aa9cced235c7b285c56c01c9579

99) 96f02d8ef6d2dcb5fb841e56f253780f1817173

98) 1bdfa9334bd0f28730f1570b3b9d1b1fd51bac43

103) -76b018a655b095fbbb330f6dfeb778d0df06bfee

97) -30f6c8033facd32d714e7c1e90cd1e9bf419bd5b

96) -24e4f8e1eda857a4300a7e3a89b0ba4e7697a116

100) 59eeaa3fcdb3879ab44ef2369d35eec881531cea

95) -16ccaea6506c588e8adc6a864429e90965d9d86

94) -7dc5b6991c563776283921b250313089f078cef3

102) -68c0406456e38e0bf98415862bce90cc53393a86

91) 1419e1efffa9ce050bff8e2b349f8eb5f23d9c5a
93) 69dff899949d6b1491cd06614753e48b7b6190cf

90) 3942b1bf462819f60150aa7686dfbea84c8585ad

92) 70bdb1c14cf5cc760be62f418e0b9780ae953bbb

87) 4464a76ae548c3ff19b233bed3bc2e9c6dc67ac2

85) 49fe7c7b1035c52a1fd0ef292cf9d4fdbce27ed4

84) 3521946973eb2ff9c9e005cfa0ff6749103f318b
89) 469ec86a97b30c18b13d3a46738aae016b065e5b

83) 53f415c4aff8113e4f649494172da3809da73b0f

82) -39d10fd6d90699552957ea722454ef139d0325d4

86) 29e56b21aee68d1b29ca30d7f1858ed7016a826a

81) 2fa08506d05f1a20b32ee6d1ce58e85125d4a9cb

80) 56a205a37676068e212d45ddcc4a8a8dff4097d8

88) 2960e36cfe87bc17ac603fc3cdb835f073df0c58

77) -4769257e3d6900a776b69fac64596079906a7c5d
79) 511e53e36cf4ad34f221e872d43758fab0d424b5

76) 553eb14d1efaa193e3c1a6019521bc11f1de32de

78) -6a90574e63f0a64cd2b78b2b11244949502e9462

73) 1771293f04b9aab370ef8bc1a5302a69e4e3457b
75) 20e532cf7f772a01627cfa8b7bc36c7f720b212

72) 1d5a00b5f3293987b24fb67347c87508e1a7c7e3

71) 57a4bed0647eccda1bdebfb2097179d2ff10126c

74) -6b85d10ee501bf377f161e1709e77c95d5c2138c

70) -7b2bd4e11fc125b2f3c5bf643d7f0cf8448438e3

Page 101

157) -103f86b495ae030dc8a4c64a9839e7d39d841b91
159) -1421392260fc7beab407d13b46767c3cf4f6a860

156) -3b4053db97405579451823ddfa8c5caaa896ae9d

158) -2ffa0ea4904759085470d2f9a327508659ddb8f6

0x10

0xa0

1.3.6.1.4.1.4447.1

k:

t:

OID:

19) -b242363ca0266f35daa5616c2c7ce4198e13d7d
21) 28bd1fb2332cf9a29c5e6a26ca2f0ddee61949fa
23) -3985a3cfd0a2ef6981ead261bdf8aa60e8e9651b
25) -2b38831dc47161777c734db09354f2aaf74434ec

22) 5ef26f0d340aa260a1fc6e7d91533d801b9e2c8c

24) 6fffcbc5b5c0238b62032795649634c446e6407d

17) 58de25876eec004264e35e59c1db2d8ac51551a5

16) 517f58dd02be4f31c1e38100d5675ead1fa252ac

20) -66773d6eb6d311a5d85eca0a76a982433d26e90c

15) 696ff6a17e804b70ddf8c3620ca2ae7440b4360e

18) daa3c106e00d7ed43a2fae88ae42bf0aff58294

13) -5b6acd7fa4c7a55867ef5626fbfa64a70633256b

9) -3eaa0b93da9d835216458e1fe2c8f8ef7f17afbd

8) 15393557ea56a4c0a8b6f4c634b63047dcba610

14) -53bb1356c8a6df88b7e5dd00af934655435adaff

7) 746a27282ce4254649e909cc8dacfd29fe171c2a

6) 4b518cd9e6ea9c94a86b47e1a119621576ad50d3

12) -63374599d87332df1b71086c56ea5d1ccd800c64

5) -288ca6e8f82872e2af8672e0043cc876f725a318

4) -37e5606899ee025374dc1d2e82f6ed38c21a0043

11) 2134156eee3a976f882ec12069a36ddda51c191c

3) -1efd40d72a06ea9443fa9f660be8dbaf316537c

2) 43a412bce0d31c3d28da78a5d07cae36a8c876a6

10) -2e90d44cf86313e0c891783fba878acedcff5a00

1) 63e06037c7dab39c91cabc0c9453a31506e71ca9

0) -4795f4bff07881489b434f4764e654d7fb3d280d

HashID: 2

0x80

l:

hashID: 0x2

Parameters:

Private: Alg: HORS Fmt: PKCS#8 HORS Public Key

153) 4ea03021f3af2c775da61892225b399f22f9585d

151) 30308ebe4f3b9b3d82280e4da1a753988cee0fcf
155) -7ca51ffab1edb5374b2042e348509d94b49a0b27

149) 67ae7b21ea32532d69f97d4b07cdb7cade820b64

148) -2ebeafa97c62580b8cf3b255fd1aa909ce0756af

150) 5795a2274c1c35dfc5d4ceea2f5dd0a1dbf808e6

152) 55781c3a37fe6b0bddd95d7e909b598826eb613d

147) 7818107106f83c02a1254e0f782bfaa931e4b9b2

146) -617e2b9b3462b9eb2e37d158d5a642996157421f

154) 7d6cc8eceb2b0e034cb90a790f8aa52d6254039a

143) 5f20e1f82bdf9ae9ea7000e834618d79099ec577
145) -39dbad1de7918e43961120920ece13f971605b52

142) 7b4d8ae78ccada0645f7bf09318323b50f7ad41c

144) -7968eff810872fe2817a82f3345b8c2186ac9ce9

139) -57f806d910c728fb8ae365fc4bd7079ecd246b65
141) -3eb61fbb127ff59c23a93eb12e8b004471a08474

138) 44df7cfb2b8a9f0000332a1e3d04e60227b866e9

137) -12d06ce6ab31ccc91671d7309860451497064b27

140) -79437f1a2dbc1570a881d6495be8cb75fec8deef

136) -5a26585a92e22bb2799b25197db0265811fcaa7d
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79) 511e53e36cf4ad34f221e872d43758fab0d424b5
81) 2fa08506d05f1a20b32ee6d1ce58e85125d4a9cb
83) 53f415c4aff8113e4f649494172da3809da73b0f

78) -6a90574e63f0a64cd2b78b2b11244949502e9462

80) 56a205a37676068e212d45ddcc4a8a8dff4097d8

82) -39d10fd6d90699552957ea722454ef139d0325d4

89) 469ec86a97b30c18b13d3a46738aae016b065e5b

77) -4769257e3d6900a776b69fac64596079906a7c5d

76) 553eb14d1efaa193e3c1a6019521bc11f1de32de

91) 1419e1efffa9ce050bff8e2b349f8eb5f23d9c5a

75) 20e532cf7f772a01627cfa8b7bc36c7f720b212

74) -6b85d10ee501bf377f161e1709e77c95d5c2138c

88) 2960e36cfe87bc17ac603fc3cdb835f073df0c58

73) 1771293f04b9aab370ef8bc1a5302a69e4e3457b

72) 1d5a00b5f3293987b24fb67347c87508e1a7c7e3

90) 3942b1bf462819f60150aa7686dfbea84c8585ad

71) 57a4bed0647eccda1bdebfb2097179d2ff10126c

70) -7b2bd4e11fc125b2f3c5bf643d7f0cf8448438e3

85) 49fe7c7b1035c52a1fd0ef292cf9d4fdbce27ed4

69) 3b13c05986ef502af6aca1c55b489e47012b7f92

68) -7a5f129ad59608faf5b9452c702742b106594689

87) 4464a76ae548c3ff19b233bed3bc2e9c6dc67ac2

67) -777e6797a27ff9cb13f20a7a26fc3b853a844694

66) -5e19700cdf55320048831a5744cd2f49f58e03aa

84) 3521946973eb2ff9c9e005cfa0ff6749103f318b

65) 3c39091b28fd0ba2b33176d996e93763338db65f

64) -563666dd1872fb9a90072020de6634da7b36c49f

86) 29e56b21aee68d1b29ca30d7f1858ed7016a826a

61) -30f760fcf9f15476cdfdec0f0da65bef682e7eaf

59) -782edf74b1d010389820c74d78ecdc4c85f1ea43

58) 662a58cea4ea4b754a8929931171e6c9547bbcaf

63) -5fd7908e7942f57421ebd94f3654aa94b41b036d

57) 7ae753b035d1a0ef603fc9d7bd8e55eed753f597

56) -141a5bb1d451e7a89a699b738f7f054400dc0785

60) 4240cc872f3e93b5666b7cb3db58bab902ae673b

55) 1065cc7e2d224b564dab8ba934ea3b413b9cad47

62) 39e8cd9718701d961a19e5ae6621b6f40a4c9e25

53) -6c7834b348fe06b8cebf4b1dd4d376f2fa6b9dd4

54) 41141267c015d74cfc6bc0f6fe1d954c9ea7cf1b

45) 3ad14d3524c49522e9ab79361d8e67dd0b471d5a

44) 39658ed5f3e48cdb882bc9536d2734c61e578eea

52) -5bf0ea3e341157c3c6dbad39c01ab7190d6b37d1

43) -2081243181557450e747d54dbfc1632ba6a6bfa2

42) -4dc9d938851c3de905f8d5bd0cfd776a7946fee8

51) 7216f61dca12f42d38fba374f758fa7a8f9adc76

41) 58e591b937c22282d4e588fbb3fd5f24f1cfc640

40) 164dc96380cdd533f544b17bb831cd40225ce03b

50) -5e6e1e73accb71a266a4f5e0851acaf8466ac4f0

39) 5e3021df8504ee55715d064965f0d2e1270f8d24

38) -15b661fa7a2d0b9d644545acfab55ec1a5debd98

47) 768075b6badd1a9cb34b7d1d8c09b3d59af29fbb

37) -717a201960acfe5a049f8287c66ecc01d0ccb204

36) 216831bc365dfe4828da40a73c20d50313bb17b6

49) -788175b990707f82ff22a00caada82558bee575b

35) -3b6689c1c0081b187eec594d3d35e83e64699cc

34) -6489d22f22f7c3110e404d85681661aaa021bc0b

46) 5feca3295cf3ba5a92ed8874a9540c8e88d64120

33) 7710358ab76c6daf2ab453d1bf6185fba157adda

32) -66f77749101fdfa56c35eeebf4769064f53eaf2f

48) 18d304676b01a613c5db8bd973cffcb63a7b2436

29) 6c72499e279331ebe4036477c68a071675eca8a1
31) -1064fd69451d255773fe9bd143221ddcd46f716f

28) -572552470f90c642bc6c54f2cd9aa10d5a54f5b

30) -53dbfa5e2a4b1fe556ee6c1831ab27a7eed91eb

27) -6b55a1c5a4daa0c55a1d9052c760d6a5e059274d

26) -4e923d7d0e8494b53bb21636f33ad9202c159759
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155) -7ca51ffab1edb5374b2042e348509d94b49a0b27
157) -103f86b495ae030dc8a4c64a9839e7d39d841b91

154) 7d6cc8eceb2b0e034cb90a790f8aa52d6254039a

156) -3b4053db97405579451823ddfa8c5caaa896ae9d

151) 30308ebe4f3b9b3d82280e4da1a753988cee0fcf
153) 4ea03021f3af2c775da61892225b399f22f9585d

150) 5795a2274c1c35dfc5d4ceea2f5dd0a1dbf808e6

152) 55781c3a37fe6b0bddd95d7e909b598826eb613d

143) 5f20e1f82bdf9ae9ea7000e834618d79099ec577

149) 67ae7b21ea32532d69f97d4b07cdb7cade820b64

141) -3eb61fbb127ff59c23a93eb12e8b004471a08474

140) -79437f1a2dbc1570a881d6495be8cb75fec8deef

142) 7b4d8ae78ccada0645f7bf09318323b50f7ad41c

148) -2ebeafa97c62580b8cf3b255fd1aa909ce0756af

139) -57f806d910c728fb8ae365fc4bd7079ecd246b65

145) -39dbad1de7918e43961120920ece13f971605b52

137) -12d06ce6ab31ccc91671d7309860451497064b27

136) -5a26585a92e22bb2799b25197db0265811fcaa7d

138) 44df7cfb2b8a9f0000332a1e3d04e60227b866e9

147) 7818107106f83c02a1254e0f782bfaa931e4b9b2

135) 582ca45b4351a007d697da4328537345ce2226d3

134) 170369967f362948ed1502a94cf9326e3d7e4b5e

144) -7968eff810872fe2817a82f3345b8c2186ac9ce9

133) -47a540e187016b064ad470e1055ad0830238e409

146) -617e2b9b3462b9eb2e37d158d5a642996157421f

131) -34989b263d27ffee6536548b3967b013a29825bb

121) 1434d2cfb171fb3759a235b7fbffe6f049d9b09f

130) -6a8fce8abc5a53e57e2ea722df7326292b408c01

119) 275371f394668c63ef8d3964024cd84f610c94a3

118) 5cf5fc8a05a650dbdcf2dd8d5d269a45fa1e16c5

120) 235740cab01b446d6b16e62fa10936687b006e0

132) 47aa31e06f4cb013e46d3ed3658358d791627b82

117) 5f397aa55bb8136fd3f115afcdd7d1a231718ddf

116) 6942811c65890ca2b6f42846506a2a92e8095416

129) 66e9167e844a19cd70fa2f3e13685161e8f31339

115) -2cf8413f2e7ea14d7bcefc7415d092583686e6b

127) ae3e49f44b4f517d76152237c37491f585b394b

113) -5023b39bc2c8e43d8c6d7952806365b164702634

112) -5f339e1bb95b8c386247d3b5bfaaf4fd46876922

114) 1200df78c59fb773000ee9be8a7c09709f088ace

128) 3bdd09f9c4f3af5b63460f00370b029ca1cdc41f

111) -45e258f82608f07346fe9ec82e2b6bc39835deee

126) 11d65394f3d33201cae8c4d5ba711dd86831cb95

109) -49967f3c737a4c6b7793ee4d40e07ba70153e36d

108) -281b7f2240862378f5895374d6003775e08fb36d

110) 59ef895af9768d70cf1393dd10a9ad2af2719c3b

123) 6bdbcec4f3b28ba42f3a380d7e5bfd70bbf81c2e

107) 48cce375c05ed0b275dd018c33de3178490d7983

125) -3b6d839e31db27f2c1b2f62fd4b24aab2a69b2cf

105) 3a6a0159d53f85a9bfd3aeebbff2f1b62b34e0e7

104) -36e89f1b2d5291bea20fa27c6906cf3645532414

106) 38a57e488941f3e1d8161fbd0271d76954692adc

122) 77ed36fb9638a0df957175937559122afc30c48b

103) -76b018a655b095fbbb330f6dfeb778d0df06bfee

102) -68c0406456e38e0bf98415862bce90cc53393a86

124) 77f285b2e201aaecaf34bc2885395c74baf0c64a

99) 96f02d8ef6d2dcb5fb841e56f253780f1817173
101) 43369ff63fa33aa9cced235c7b285c56c01c9579

97) -30f6c8033facd32d714e7c1e90cd1e9bf419bd5b

96) -24e4f8e1eda857a4300a7e3a89b0ba4e7697a116

100) 59eeaa3fcdb3879ab44ef2369d35eec881531cea

95) -16ccaea6506c588e8adc6a864429e90965d9d86

94) -7dc5b6991c563776283921b250313089f078cef3

98) 1bdfa9334bd0f28730f1570b3b9d1b1fd51bac43

93) 69dff899949d6b1491cd06614753e48b7b6190cf

92) 70bdb1c14cf5cc760be62f418e0b9780ae953bbb
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159) -1421392260fc7beab407d13b46767c3cf4f6a860

0x10

0xa0

1.3.6.1.4.1.4447.1

k:

t:

OID:

0x10

0xa0

1.3.6.1.4.1.4447.1

k:

t:

OID:

Bob’s Key was successfully reconstructed

Alice’s Key was successfully reconstructed

Public : 1.3.6.1.4.1.4447.1 X.509

Key Information:

* Public Key generated cleanly

Public : 1.3.6.1.4.1.4447.1 X.509

Key Information:

* Public Key generated cleanly

HashID: 2

0x80

l:

hashID: 0x2

Parameters:

Private: Alg: HORS Fmt: PKCS#8 HORS Public Key

HashID: 2

0x80

l:

hashID: 0x2

Parameters:

Public : Alg: HORS Fmt: X.509 HORS Public Key

Key Information:

* KeyPair generated cleanly

158) -2ffa0ea4904759085470d2f9a327508659ddb8f6
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0
55
10

[x] Public Key Exchange:

[x] Rebuild Alices Key:

[x] Rebuild Bobs Key:
1709

100

[x] Keypair Generation (Bob)

TOTAL TIME:

1
638

[x] Key Generator load (Bob):

[x] Key Generator load (Alice)

[x] Keypair Generation (Alice):

876
29

[x] Provider load:

TIMING PROFILE (milliseconds):
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Appendix D

Codebase Statistics
Table and statistics generated by JavaNCSS package, available at
<http://www.kclee.com/clemens/java/javancss/>.

D.1 Lines of Code per Package
Special note: The key encoding functionality was adapted from the Sun JDK source download via [29], and resides in the edu.rit.m2mp.security.keycommon package. Some additional
functionality exists in the edu.rit.m2mp.security.keyagree package for proper reconstruction of public and private keys
This is due to the need for key encoding support at a lower level than available through the
java.* packages, and to compensate for the instability of the sun.* and com.sun.* packages.
It was observed that direct dependence upon these ’hidden’ packages proved fatal when moving
between JDK versions 1.4.1 and 1.4.2.

D.2 Lines of Code per Java File
The statistics in Table D.2 are a partial report, trimmed for space considerations.
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Thu, Apr 01, 2004
Classes Methods

16:04:45 America/New_York
NCSS

Javadocs Package

14

154

1619

158 edu.rit.m2mp.security

2

24

342

1

3

193

1

15

192

1

4

61

5 edu.rit.m2mp.security.handlers

1

5

40

0 edu.rit.m2mp.security.handlers.test

9

149

1323

6

41

458

10

185

1363

15

107

551

2

13

163

12

144

1280

5

9

26

14 edu.rit.m2mp.security.signatures.hors.interfaces

3

17

75

20 edu.rit.m2mp.security.signatures.hors.spec

4

39

858

3

20

118

26 edu.rit.m2mp.security.comm
0 edu.rit.m2mp.security.comm.test
16 edu.rit.m2mp.security.crypto

138 edu.rit.m2mp.security.keyagree
2 edu.rit.m2mp.security.keyagree.test
154 edu.rit.m2mp.security.keycommon
113 edu.rit.m2mp.security.messages
13 edu.rit.m2mp.security.signatures
139 edu.rit.m2mp.security.signatures.hors

2 edu.rit.m2mp.security.signatures.hors.test
27 edu.rit.m2mp.security.utils

-------- ------- ------ --------89
Packages

929

8662

827 Total

Classes Functions

NCSS

Javadocs | per

------------------------------------------------------------16.00

89.00

929.00

8662.00

827.00 | Project

5.56

58.06

541.38

51.69 | Package

10.44

97.33
9.32

9.29 | Class
0.89 | Function

Table D.1: Codebase Statistics – Lines of Code per Package

D.2 Lines of Code per Java File

Thu, Apr 01, 2004
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16:04:45 America/New_York

NCSS Methods Class
184

3

edu.rit.m2mp.security.comm.test.CommPortTest

294

21

edu.rit.m2mp.security.comm.CommPort

30

3

edu.rit.m2mp.security.comm.Reader

2

1

edu.rit.m2mp.security.keycommon.DerEncoder

179

14

edu.rit.m2mp.security.keycommon.DerIndefLenConverter

171

17

edu.rit.m2mp.security.keycommon.DerInputBuffer

181

37

edu.rit.m2mp.security.keycommon.DerInputStream

173

34

edu.rit.m2mp.security.keycommon.DerOutputStream

349

50

edu.rit.m2mp.security.keycommon.DerValue

158

15

edu.rit.m2mp.security.keycommon.ObjectIdentifier

89

15

edu.rit.m2mp.security.keycommon.BitArray

10

1

edu.rit.m2mp.security.keycommon.ByteArrayLexOrder

5

1

edu.rit.m2mp.security.keycommon.ByteArrayTagOrder

184

15

edu.rit.m2mp.security.crypto.CryptoEngine

34

5

edu.rit.m2mp.security.handlers.test.DiscoveryTest

52

4

edu.rit.m2mp.security.handlers.Discovery

17

2

edu.rit.m2mp.security.keyagree.test.Test

170

13

edu.rit.m2mp.security.keyagree.test.KeySizeTest

40

6

edu.rit.m2mp.security.keyagree.test.AgreementLoaderTest

37

6

edu.rit.m2mp.security.keyagree.test.KeyDistroInvestigation

53

5

edu.rit.m2mp.security.keyagree.test.ParameterCycleTest

107

9

edu.rit.m2mp.security.keyagree.test.KeyAgreementTest

238

24

edu.rit.m2mp.security.keyagree.AgreementEngine

122

12

edu.rit.m2mp.security.keyagree.DHPrivateKey

111

12

edu.rit.m2mp.security.keyagree.DHPublicKey

267

31

edu.rit.m2mp.security.keyagree.AgreementImpl

128

15

edu.rit.m2mp.security.keyagree.TreeAgreement

33

11

edu.rit.m2mp.security.keyagree.Node

11

3

edu.rit.m2mp.security.keyagree.KeyProxy

334

38

edu.rit.m2mp.security.keyagree.Tree

9

3

edu.rit.m2mp.security.keyagree.MemberNode
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12

6

edu.rit.m2mp.security.messages.AdminMessage

11

5

edu.rit.m2mp.security.messages.ApplicationMessage

10

9

edu.rit.m2mp.security.messages.GroupMessage

53

18

edu.rit.m2mp.security.messages.GroupMessageImpl

76

16

edu.rit.m2mp.security.messages.JoinGrant

84

16

edu.rit.m2mp.security.messages.JoinRequest

37

9

edu.rit.m2mp.security.messages.AgreeSet

7

3

edu.rit.m2mp.security.messages.ACK

18

4

edu.rit.m2mp.security.messages.AgreeAck

7

3

edu.rit.m2mp.security.messages.LeaveRequest

61

5

edu.rit.m2mp.security.messages.MessageConstants

125

4

edu.rit.m2mp.security.messages.MessageUtils

7

3

edu.rit.m2mp.security.messages.NACK

7

3

edu.rit.m2mp.security.messages.RefreshKeyRequest

7

3

edu.rit.m2mp.security.messages.NewKey

2

1

edu.rit.m2mp.security.signatures.hors.interfaces.HORSKey

3

2

edu.rit.m2mp.security.signatures.hors.interfaces.HORSKeyPairGenerator

5

4

edu.rit.m2mp.security.signatures.hors.interfaces.HORSParams

2

1

edu.rit.m2mp.security.signatures.hors.interfaces.HORSPrivateKey

2

1

edu.rit.m2mp.security.signatures.hors.interfaces.HORSPublicKey

21

5

edu.rit.m2mp.security.signatures.hors.spec.HORSParameterSpec

22

6

edu.rit.m2mp.security.signatures.hors.spec.HORSPrivateKeySpec

22

6

edu.rit.m2mp.security.signatures.hors.spec.HORSPublicKeySpec

166

14

edu.rit.m2mp.security.signatures.hors.test.FactoryTest

325

6

edu.rit.m2mp.security.signatures.hors.test.HORSTest

232

17

edu.rit.m2mp.security.signatures.hors.test.ProviderTest

117

2

edu.rit.m2mp.security.signatures.hors.test.SignExample

61

14

edu.rit.m2mp.security.signatures.hors.AlgIdHORS

255

24

edu.rit.m2mp.security.signatures.hors.AlgorithmId

154

20

edu.rit.m2mp.security.signatures.hors.PKCS8Key

149

22

edu.rit.m2mp.security.signatures.hors.X509Key

75

5

edu.rit.m2mp.security.signatures.hors.HORSKeyFactory

121

11

edu.rit.m2mp.security.signatures.hors.HORSKeyPairGenerator

41

5

edu.rit.m2mp.security.signatures.hors.HORSParameterGenerator

56

12

edu.rit.m2mp.security.signatures.hors.HORSParameters

58

8

edu.rit.m2mp.security.signatures.hors.HORSPrivateKey

15

1

edu.rit.m2mp.security.signatures.hors.HORSProvider

53

8

edu.rit.m2mp.security.signatures.hors.HORSPublicKey

145

14

edu.rit.m2mp.security.signatures.hors.HORSSignature

D.2 Lines of Code per Java File
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149

11

edu.rit.m2mp.security.signatures.SigningEngine

3

2

edu.rit.m2mp.security.signatures.SigningEngineDef

18

4

edu.rit.m2mp.security.utils.Arrays

37

7

edu.rit.m2mp.security.utils.Numbers

58

9

edu.rit.m2mp.security.utils.ThreadPool

20

5

edu.rit.m2mp.security.DefaultExceptionListener

3

2

edu.rit.m2mp.security.ExceptionHandler

3

2

edu.rit.m2mp.security.ExceptionListener

504

22

edu.rit.m2mp.security.MessageHandler

151

12

edu.rit.m2mp.security.ProtocolConstants

340

60

edu.rit.m2mp.security.Repository

123

31

edu.rit.m2mp.security.SecureChannel

4

3

edu.rit.m2mp.security.NullOutputListener

4

3

edu.rit.m2mp.security.NullExceptionListener

77

5

edu.rit.m2mp.security.ProviderInfo

3

2

edu.rit.m2mp.security.OutputListener

2

1

edu.rit.m2mp.security.OutputHandler

9

3

edu.rit.m2mp.security.DefaultOutputListener

324

3

edu.rit.m2mp.security.ChannelDemo

Average Object NCSS:

92.45

Average Object Functions:

10.44

Average Object Inner Classes:

0.42

Average Object Javadoc Comments:

9.29

Program NCSS:

8,662.00

Table D.2: Codebase Statistics – Lines of Code per Class
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